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Abstract 
 
China’s shift away from the welfare housing scheme has generated tremendous demand for 
private home ownership since the early 1990’s.  The resulting growth in the housing market 
fueled the country’s transformation towards a market economy.  However, the transition has not 
been without problems.  One of the main issues the government has been grappling with is the 
dispute between developers and residents over low rates of resettlement compensation.   
 
This thesis offers a compound option model to analyze the existing land disposal system in 
China.  Assuming Shanghai’s land market is efficient and the market values of land-use rights 
converge to the option values of land, the model identifies the maximum values of tenants’ 
resettlement and infrastructure components of the total land values developers can rationally pay 
to avoid negative-NPV investment decisions. 
 
The model suggests a compensation cost function of about 51 percent of total land value 
(conveyance fee plus resettlement and infrastructure cost), or 26 percent of the underlying asset 
value upon sales of the residential development.   
 
It is the recommendation of this thesis that the Chinese government reexamines the existing land 
conveyance system to formally include tenants’ resettlement compensation and infrastructural 
fees as part of the land-use rights bidding package.  This thesis further recommends legal 
recognitions of tenants’ ‘invisible leasehold interests’ to strengthen their rights to the land on 
which they reside. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis Supervisor David Geltner 
Title   Professor, Real Estate Finance and Investment 
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Chapter One  Introduction 
Recent statistical data published by the U.S. Department of State reports that China’s economy 
has grown more than tenfold since it opened its door to the outside world in 1979.  Direct 
investments in real estate have provided an important base for China’s economy growth.  To put 
this in perspective, during the January-March period of 2004, the total investment in commercial 
real estate reached 182 billion RMB (US$21.9 billion), an increase of 41 percent compared with 
a year ago.  In particular, investment in residential homes rose 36 percent to 120.3 billion RMB 
(US$14.5 billion).1  The tremendous growth experienced in China’s residential housing market 
established it as an essential industry in the national economy.  With a population of 1.26 billion 
expected to grow to 1.61 billion by 2050, an annual housing demand of 486 million to 549 
million square meters (5.23 billion to 5.91 billion square feet) is projected for the first 20 years 
of the 21st century.2  The importance of a residential market in a region’s economic growth is 
undisputed.  It is most evident by the developments in Shanghai in recent years. 
 
                                                 
1 China Daily, April 23, 2004. 
 
2 The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. 
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Due to its prominence as a financial center, Shanghai has enjoyed much attention in China’s 
economic prosperity.  Shanghai's average housing price reached 5,118 RMB (US$616.71) per 
square meter in 2003, quadrupling the national average of 1,166 RMB (US$140.50).3  Its real 
estate market is arguably more mature and efficient than the rest of the country due to vast 
investments by foreign companies.  Recognizing the importance of a transparent real estate 
system in attracting investment capital, Shanghai’s development of land-use rights and real estate 
regulations can also be seen as the best barometer for future national level guidelines.  In June 
2003, the Shanghai Supervision Committee and Land Resource Bureau announced the 
‘Supervisory Regulation on Land Use Rights Tender’ to standardize the primary land market.  
The same year, the People’s Bank of China also issued the ‘Notice to Further Enhance 
Administration of Real Estate Credit Loan’4, a guideline on mortgages, including raising the 
down payment threshold and interest rate, among other recommendations to tighten credit 
control on developers, bringing investment discipline and stability to the real estate market.5   
 
According to statistics published by the Ministry of Land and Resources, the price of land in 
Shanghai registered a sharp rise between 2002 and 2003.  The city sold 151 pieces of land 
totaling 1,260 hectares last year through public bidding, with the unit price averaging 1.05 
million RMB (US$126,987) for one fifteenth of a hectare, up 124 percent over the price of the 
                                                 
3 China Daily, April 02, 2004. 
 
4 The Circular requires a developer to have capital equal to not less than 30% of the total investment of a real estate 
project before the developer borrows from the commercial banks.  Commercial loans may only be used for real 
estate projects located in the region where the bank is located.  According to the Circular, no commercial bank 
should grant a loan to a developer for the purpose of paying a land grant fee. 
 
5 “Shanghai Property Investment Climate”, February 2004, Colliers International Topical Research Report, Colliers 
International, Shanghai. 
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previous year.6  While this rising momentum in land transaction prices has benefited Shanghai’s 
government in fueling much of the social developments on the local level, it has not translated to 
a proportional increase in tenants’ resettlement compensation.  
 
The Chinese government’s reform efforts in making the land disposal system more efficient 
seem to have exacerbated the dispute between developers and residents over low rates of 
resettlement compensation.  Even though the national demolition regulations clearly states that 
developers must pay evictees compensation equal to the full market value of their properties, the 
law provide little guidance in calculating the true market value of their leasehold interests. 
 
Given the uncertain future and the irreversibility of investment in real estate development, the 
observed phenomenon raises several important questions in the context of Real Option Theory.  
How does the existing land disposal system affect urban land price?  Is real option premium 
observed in the Shanghai land market?  What is the market value of tenant leasehold interest 
implied by the actual land transaction price? 
 
As an introduction to the thesis, the subsequent chapter is organized into five sections.  To 
establish the background for further analysis, the first section examines the development of land-
use policy and legislation in China.  The second section details current land market structures.  
The third section further describes the real estate development process.  The fourth section 
identifies real options in residential housing development and the fifth outlines research 
objectives. 
 
                                                 
6 China Daily, March 2004. 
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1.1  Land-Use Policy and Legislation Reform 
Prosperity brought about by China’s economic growth in the last two decades has gradually 
changed the government’s attitude towards free markets.  Relying on the strength of its social 
and political infrastructure, the Chinese government started a revolution on the supply of land, 
with the State Council’s proposal of a new policy for the transferability of land-use rights in the 
free market, and pilot reform tests conducted in six cities including Shanghai in 1987.   
 
In April 1988, the National People’s Congress adopted an amendment to Article 10 of China’s 
Constitution:7 
 
ARTICLE 10.  Land in the cities is owned by the state.  Land in the rural and 
suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions which belong to 
the state in accordance with the law; house sites and private plots of cropland and 
hilly land are also owned by collectives.  The state may in the public interest take 
over land for its use in accordance with the law.  No organization or individual 
may appropriate, buy, sell or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful 
means.  The right to the use of land may be transferred according to law.  All 
organizations and individuals who use land must make rational use of the land. 
 
(Text in italic represents amendment from the original article: ‘No organization 
or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease land, or unlawfully transfer land 
in other ways’) 
 
                                                 
7 Amendment One to the Constitution, approved on April 12, 1988, by the 7th NPC at its 1st Session. 
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This historically significant amendment to the Constitution formed the basic building block of a 
socialist-market economy in real estate – the recognition of a transferable land-use interest where 
private property rights are divisible from public land ownership.  Moreover, the “Land 
Management Law’ was amended at the same year to introduce the concept of ‘land lease’ to 
China’s legal and ideological framework.8 
 
In 1990, the State Council enacted the ‘Interim Regulations on Assignment and Transfer of Right 
to Use State-owned Land in Urban Areas’.  In line with the modified Constitution, the new 
regulation explicitly stipulated that land-use right may be transferred by ways of contract, tender 
and auction.  These reform efforts not only helped to restore the original commodity nature of 
the state-owned land assets at the levels of law and regulations, but also paved the way for the 
establishment of land markets.9 
 
The State Council issued the ‘Regulations on the Implementation of Land Administration Law’ 
in 1998, in accordance with the ‘Revised Administration Law’ to institute the transference of 
urban land-use right by way of compensation to the government.  
 
Changes in the legal system have been critical to real estate activities since 1988.  However, 
physical developments were surging beyond legal progress.  Aimed to establish a more effective 
system for land use, the ‘Land Administration Law’ came into effect in 1999 to tighten control 
over non-agricultural use of arable land.  Under the New Land Law, land is divided into three 
                                                 
8 Chapter Two of the Land Management Law of the People’s Republic of China was amended from the original 
statement ‘No enterprises or individuals can possess, sell or rent or by any illegal means transfer land’ to ‘No 
enterprises or individuals can possess, sell or by any illegal means transfer land’.  The word ‘rent’ was omitted. 
 
9 “The Process of Marketization of Land in Retrospect,” November 2003, China Internet Information Center. 
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types: agricultural land, construction land and unutilized land.  The New Land Law significantly 
tightens the existing size-limit approval mechanism and the control over basic crop land.  It also 
introduces an arable land-usage conversion procedure for approval of new construction land, as 
well as the requirement of the local land bureau’s preliminary examination report at the time of 
the project feasibility study submission.  Lastly, the New Land Law enhanced the legal effect of 
master and annual land-use plans approved by the State Council or the provincial governments, 
to be contended by local governments and land users.10  One of the important implications of the 
New Land Law is its reaffirmation of the legality of the contribution of land-use rights as capital. 
 
To establish and improve the administration system of land transactions and to standardize the 
operation of the physical market, the Ministry of Land and Resources promulgated the ‘Circular 
of the Ministry of Land and Resource on Establishing the Physical Land Market and Promoting 
the Standard Transactions of Right of Land Use’ in 2000.  The Circular focuses on improving the 
following systems: 
1) Controlling system of total supplies of land for construction purposes. 
2) Centralized supplying system on urban lands for construction purposes. 
3) Public transaction system of right of land use. 
4) The system of regular renewal and promulgating of standard land prices. 
5) Inquiry system for land registration. 
6) Collective decision-making system. 
 
                                                 
10 Chan, Rico, “Green Acres: A new land law attempts to reset China’s complex land-use policies,” July 1999, 
China Business Review. 
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In 2001, the State Council publicized the ‘Circular on Strengthening the Administration of Land 
Assets’ to further improve the land market mechanism.  A series of new measures formulated to 
focus on controlling total supplies of land for construction purposes, combining the system of 
state-owned land use with compensation, promoting auction by open tender, strengthening the 
administration of transference of land-use right, enhancing the administration of land assets and 
standardizing the examination and approval of land were established.11 
 
China’s land market reform has come a long way since the initial pilot programs in 1987.  One 
should not be surprised by the motive behind China’s property rights development -- to fuel an 
effective marketplace and encourage an adequate distribution of resources.  As reflected by real 
estate law professor Patrick Randolph in a recent paper, the Chinese value individual property 
because this is in the best interests of the collective.12   
 
1.1.1 Land-Title System 
Land is a state asset in China.  As previously described in Article 10 of the Constitution of 
People’s Republic of China, land ownership can be categorized into ‘state-ownership’ (guoyou 
tudi) and ‘collective-ownership’ (jiti tudi).  State-owned land is identified as all land in urban 
areas and uncultivated land in remote areas.  Chinese law prohibits transferring ownership of 
state-owned land.  However, the State Council is permitted as a representative to the State to 
grant, lease, or allocate land-use rights for state-owned land.  In 1990, the ‘Urban Land 
Regulations’ and the ‘Urban Real Estate Law’ in 1994 extended the authorization to grant long-
                                                 
11 “The Process of Marketization of Land in Retrospect,” November 2003, China Internet Information Center. 
 
12 Randolph, Patrick A., “Ownership with Chinese Characteristics: Private Property Rights and Land Reform in the 
PRC,” February 2003, Congressional-Executive Commission on China Issues Roundtable. 
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term land-use rights for state owned land to local land bureaus at the county and municipal 
levels. 
 
Collective-owned land is defined as agricultural land and homestead in suburban and rural areas.  
Transferring this type of land ownership is theoretically possible under Chinese law.  But legal 
restrictions have made it practically infeasible to do so.  Land-use rights and land-contracting 
rights for collective-owned land are provided by rural collectives to peasants and other land 
users.13  In turn, the peasants have some autonomy in the management of their allocated farm 
plots and agricultural enterprises.14 
 
1.1.2 Land-Use Rights 
There are two main types of land-use rights in China promulgated by the Land Administration 
Law in 1986: ‘allocated land-use right’ (huabo tudi shiyongquan) and ‘granted land-use right’ 
(churang tudi shiyongquan).  Allocated land-use rights stem from socialist roots, given through 
an administrative approval by the government without the payment of a land grant fee and exist 
without term limits.  However, it may not be held by private individuals or entities.  It is 
conveyed by the land authorities for specified purposes and is not transferable without 
conversion into granted land-use right.  Due to the lack of contractual protection in a non-grant 
                                                 
13 Chan, Rico, “Green Acres: A new land law attempts to reset China’s complex land-use policies,” July 1999, 
China Business Review. 
 
14 Randolph, Patrick A., “Ownership with Chinese Characteristics: Private Property Rights and Land Reform in the 
PRC,” February 2003, Congressional-Executive Commission on China Issues Roundtable. 
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system, this type of land-use right may be recalled by the government for reasons of public 
interest, without compensation in most cases.15 
 
On the other hand, granted land-use rights are the product of a market economy, obtained by 
land-users through the signing of a land grant contract with the State Council and upon the 
payment of an upfront land grant fee proportional to the land’s expected return.  In turn, 
individuals or organizations are granted legal protections to the leaseholds, limited to a fixed 
term.  Depending on the type of land-use and zoning regulations, the maximum term of a land 
grant ranges from 40 years for commercial, tourism and recreational purpose, 50 years for 
industrial, educational, scientific research, cultural, public health, sport and comprehensive 
purpose or other use, to 70 years for residential use.  Granted land-use right is most similar to the 
long-term ground lease in the United States.  It may be transferred, leased, or mortgaged in 
accordance with the law and the terms of the land-use contract.16 
 
1.2  Land Market Structure 
To serve the development needs of a socialist-market economy, three levels of land markets have 
been structured under the current regulations in China:17  (Figure 1) 
 
1) First Tier:  Market for Land Grant by the State to Developer. 
                                                 
15 Kaufman, Ezekiel, “Effective Land-Use Policy and Legislation in China: The Key to the Future of Urban 
Development of the World’s Most Populous Nation,” 1st Quarter 2004, Holland & Knight News – Property Writes, 
8, 1, 12-13. 
 
16 Chan, Rico, “Green Acres: A new land law attempts to reset China’s complex land-use policies,” July 1999, 
China Business Review. 
 
17 Li, Ling Hin, “Establishing a Socialist Urban Land Market: The Case of Shanghai, China,” 2003, Lincoln Institute 
of Land Policy Conference Paper, Lincoln Land Institute of Land Policy. 
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This is also known as a primary market whereby a lease hold interest is created.  
Land-use rights are granted on a long term basis by the local land bureaus on the 
state’s behalf to developers through public auction, bid or negotiation.  This type 
of market is monopolistic in nature due to State control. 
 
2) Second Tier:  Market for Land Transfers among Developers. 
This is also known as a secondary market.  Upon acquiring land-use rights and 
fulfilling certain physical developments required by law, developers may transfer 
lease hold interests to other developers or end users.  For instance, in Shanghai, at 
lease 75 percent of total stipulated development cost has to be spent before land-
use rights can be resold.  Such restrictions are established to discourage raw land 
speculation.  
 
3) Third Tier:  Transfer of Developed Real Estate among End Users. 
This tertiary market was established to encourage an adequate distribution of 
resources among end users by means of transferring developed real estate together 
with land lease-hold interest attached.   
 
1.3  Real Estate Development Process 
Given the reform efforts China has undertaken towards a socialist-market economy in real estate, 
developers can freely purchase land-use rights from the administration for private development 
as they see fit.  In return, real estate transactions in the primary market have fueled much social 
development on the local level.  In this section, we will examine the following issues critical in 
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the real estate development process: pricing of land, granting of land-use rights, resettlement 
practices, commencement of construction, transferring of land-use rights and finally, land-use 
contract renewal.  
 
1.3.1 Pricing of Land 
One of the main objectives of the urban land reform is to determine appropriate compensation to 
the State for the use of land according to the price mechanism in a commercial land market while 
maintaining China’s socialist ideology.  Basic market principles imply that land price represents 
the summation of the discounted future cash flow from land improvements less the development 
cost.  It is typically represented by the capitalist view of residual land value concept.   
 
However, under socialist principles, value is heavily influenced by the concept of production 
cost function.  Cost becomes the subconscious guide to the formulation of value, where price of a 
product is determined by the sum of input costs, depending on a fixed input structure and a 
certain percentage profit.  The exchange value of a commodity is not considered as important as 
the production cost function of the commodity.18  Consequently, it is very difficult to determine 
the value of land.  Given that land has no production cost, it cannot be measured by the amount 
of labor expended on production. 
 
Since socialist ideology fails to establish a solid basis for the measurement of land price, a 
benchmark land price had to be devised by the authorities as the official guide to average land 
value for a specific location.  Even under such circumstances, the production cost function 
concept has greatly influenced the valuation of land, reflected in recent research on the market 
                                                 
18 Li, Ling Hin, “Privatization of Urban Land in Shanghai,” 1996, Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong. 
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price of Shanghai’s land-use rights.  Rather than relying on the residual land value concept, 
Shanghai’s land price has been determined in the form of a component structure.  According to a 
working paper by Li Lin Hin (1994): 
 
…market price of land use rights in Shanghai can be viewed as an additive 
element of the two parties’ interests.  The first one is the price for the land portion 
which is obtained by the local authority as the land-use rights owner or a 
reversionary freehold interest with encumbrances of an undefined leasehold 
interest on land.  The second portion is the price of the build structure (or 
resettlement from this build structure) on which the sitting tenants have an 
invisible leasehold.  These two together produce a production cost function that 
reflects the traditional socialist economic view of the ‘value’…19 
 
1.3.2 Granting of Land-Use Rights 
In recent years, the sale of granted land-use rights in the primary market has created a major 
source of urban land for development.  Learning from Hong Kong’s experience, the government 
is controlling real estate development by limiting sales of land-use rights in the primary market.  
‘The Provisional Regulations on Grant and Transfer of Use Rights to State-owned Land in Urban 
Areas’ promulgated by the State Council in 1990 stipulates the manners by which the right to use 
land may be granted:  
1) By agreement. 
2) By invitations or tender. 
                                                 
19 Li, Ling Hin, “Determination of Land Prices in Shanghai under a Transitional Economy,” 1994, Real Estate 
Research  Institute Working Paper, Real Estate Research  Institute. 
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3) By bidding or auction. 
 
In practice, not every local government utilizes all three types of land conveying procedures, 
since there is no detailed guidance from the central government.  In general, sale by agreement 
has traditionally been the most popular method in most cities.  However, the proportion of land 
areas allocated administratively without monetary compensation to the government still far 
exceeds the proportion conveyed through the market mechanism.  For the purpose of this thesis, 
we will focus on the following public tender procedures for land sales in Shanghai since it is the 
best barometer to future national level guidelines:20 
 
1) Invitation for public tendering is released on the government designated 
information source, such as the official website for information releases. 
 
2) It takes approximately two months before the date of tender closing.  After 
which date, the tendering packages including detailed information for the site and 
application form is available at the District Real Estate Bureau. 
 
3) Approximately two months after that, the District Real Estate Bureau 
organizes the site inspection and Q&A session. 
 
4) Interested parties, with no specific provisions on the qualifications of bidders, 
submit the bid document about five weeks after the invitation. 
                                                 
20 Lu, William, “China Real Estate Market Briefing – 2003 in review,” April 2004, ING Real Estate Investment 
Management. 
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5) On the morning of the tender closing date, a Tender Evaluation Committee 
which normally includes two members from the local Real Estate Bureau and five 
professional members randomly selected from relevant government authorities 
such as Planning, Construction and Finance Administration Bureau, determines 
the winning bidder based on the standard evaluation criteria.  The criteria are 
based on three separate sections of ‘Pricing Bid’, ‘Technical Bid’ and 
‘Commercial Bid’, on a one hundred point scale.  Even tough Pricing Bid may be 
the most important factor which accounts for 70 points, higher bidding price does 
not guarantee a higher score.  The highest mark is awarded to the bidding price 
closest to the average figure.  ‘Technical Bid’ is score on the merits of the 
proposed project design which accounts for 14 points.  While ‘Commercial Bid’ 
which reflects the developer’s financial status and tract records, accounts for the 
remaining 16 points.   
 
6) Winning tender will be announced on the same day of the tender closing.  The 
grantee will sign the State Owned Land Use Rights Grant Contract with the 
District Real Estate Bureau within a specified time period. 
 
7) After execution of the contract for the grant of land use right, land users must 
pay in full the fee for the grant of the right to use land within 60 days. If a land 
Chapter 1 
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user fails to make full payment within such time limit, the grantor has the right to 
rescind the contract and may claim liquidated damages.21 
 
Through this land conveyance mechanism, the government is able to stimulate market demand 
and speed up market activities, while maintaining control of the market land prices.  Residual 
land value seen from the capitalist view is often transferred to subsidize the developer for the 
resettlement cost of sitting tenants.  As one may suspect, the system of identification and 
regulation of those who receive land-use rights has been a major source of corruption.  The 
efficient land market mechanism fails when local land bureaus award land-use rights to favored 
persons at sub-optimal prices.  Even in areas where the public land auction requirement was 
enacted, exceptions to the rule crept in that preserved the options to local officials in ‘special 
cases’.22  These irregularities in the land disposal system introduced additional uncertainties to 
the market.  As a result in some cases, the land-use transaction prices in some cases may not 
reflect the true value of the land, and the rights may not be granted to those who value the land 
the most.  However, this problem is less so in Shanghai, where the land market is much more 
efficient and transparent. 
 
1.3.3 Resettlement and Infrastructure 
One of the main problems a grantee has to contend with upon acquiring land-use rights from the 
local government and before any development can occur is the resettlement of sitting tenants.  In 
the United States, an efficient market system will provide alternative housing for residents living 
                                                 
21 Ron Cai, “Land Use Rights and Employment Contract in China,” September 2001, David Wright Tremaine LLP 
Advisory Bulletins. 
 
22 Randolph, Patrick A., “Ownership with Chinese Characteristics: Private Property Rights and Land Reform in the 
PRC,” February 2003, Congressional-Executive Commission on China Issues Roundtable. 
Chapter 1 
20 
in such situations.  Usually rental tenants have little rights beyond relocation allowance from the 
developer.  China, on the other hand, is quite a different story.  Sitting tenants who traditionally 
relied on the State to provide housing have been given quite a lot of informal protection by the 
government.   
 
Subsection Three of China’s ‘Regulations for the Management of Urban Residential Demolition 
and Eviction’ passed by the State Council in 2001 addresses compensation and resettlement of 
sitting tenants.  It stipulates that developers must pay sitting tenants compensation equal to the 
full market value of their properties.  The sum of the compensation money will be determined 
based on the location, use, construction area and other factors, and by using the appraised real 
estate market price of the demolished home.23   
 
Ambiguities in the resettlement guidelines often lead a grantee to bargain with local government 
over the cost of relocation.  However, compensation responsibility is ultimately placed on the 
developer.24  Once the developer acquires the land-use right for a particular property, he must 
obtain permits from Demolition and Eviction Management Departments within each municipal 
government before clearing the site.  These government departments are responsible for the 
process of demolition and eviction.  Required by law, they are to advise sitting tenants of their 
eviction and to carry out compensation negotiation on the behalf of the developers.  Generally 
there are three ways to resolve the issue of tenant resettlement under current practices: 
 
                                                 
23 Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli Tiaoli, (Regulations for the Management of Urban Residential Demolition 
and Eviction), Article 24. 
 
24 Randolph, Patrick A., “Property Seizures in China: Politics, Law, and Protest,” June 2004, Congressional-
Executive Commission on China Issues Roundtable. 
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1) Cash Payments. 
Developers often pay out relocation fees to release sitting tenants of further rights 
and obligations to the land. 
 
2) Replacement housing facilities. 
Developers may elect to move sitting tenants to an alternative housing facility.  
Tenants often negotiate additional compensation of the ‘location value’. 
 
3) Temporary resettlement with option to purchase. 
Developers may establish temporary resettlement of sitting tenants while 
construction is underway.  Upon the completion of improvements, a transfer lease 
holds interests back to sitting tenants at a pre-negotiated price.  
 
In the case when developers and residents fail to reach a compensation agreement, the law 
permits the developers to proceed with ‘qiangzhi chaiqian’ or forced eviction, once they petition 
the demolition and eviction departments.25  Since alternative housing options and compensation 
responsibilities are placed on the developer, tenant resettlement may represent a major cost in 
addition to the land-grant fees a developer pays to the local government.   
 
Aside from the cost of tenant resettlements, China’s lack of municipal financing system to 
support the construction of infrastructure adds another layer of uncertainty in the development 
process.  In some cases, this pay-as-you-go system of financing infrastructure has amounted to a 
                                                 
25 Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli Tiaoli, (Regulations for the Management of Urban Residential Demolition 
and Eviction), Article 17. 
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considerable portion of the total land cost.26  (For simplicity of analysis, this thesis will include 
infrastructure cost component as part of the tenant resettlement cost structure.) 
 
1.3.4 Construction 
It should be noted that speculation of raw land is prohibited through the requirement stipulating 
that the user commence proposed development within a two-year time frame.  According to the 
Urban Planning Law and the Urban Planning Regulation of Shanghai, a land user is required to 
have relevant approval documents for construction activities, in addition to the Planning Permit 
for Construction Land (PPCL) and Planning Permit for Construction Projects (PPCPs) from the 
urban planning department.27  In the case of a land user failing to develop or utilize the land in 
accordance with the schedule and conditions specified in the documents, the land administration 
department of the municipal or county government will correct such situation by fines and the 
possible reversion of land-use rights back to the government.  However, partly due to sitting 
tenant resettlement uncertainties, commencement of construction has been liberally defined.  
Negotiation with the local government in resettlement procedures and development timing is a 
common practice. 
 
1.3.5 Transferring of Land-Use Rights 
Upon 70 percent completion of proposed construction, the developer may transfer land-use rights 
to end users to finance the project.  To regulate real estate sales and protect end users’ interests, 
the government released the revised Model Commercial / Commodity Housing Purchase / Sell 
                                                 
26 Dowall, David E., “Establishing Urban Land Markets in the People’s Republic of China,” Spring 2003, Journal of 
the American Planning Association, 59, 2, 182-192. 
 
27 Li, Ling Hin, “Urban Land Reform in China,” 1999, St. Martin’s Press,Inc., New York. 
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Contract in September 2000.  It allows potential real property buyers and sellers to understand 
what is involved in a real estate transaction. The government hopes it will eventually help 
consumers reduce their risk in home purchases.28  In line with the housing reform package 
introduced by Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in March 1998, the model contract is to ease China’s 
transition from state sponsored welfare housing to free market private home ownership.  
 
1.3.6 Land-Use Contract Renewal 
The Chinese real estate legal system has yet to be tested regarding lessee’s rights to renewal 
upon the expiration of land lease term, since land-use contracts from the early 1990’s are still far 
from maturity.  The law is clear on the lessee’s ‘right of first refusal’ in renewing the lease hold 
interests.  Under section 41, Chapter Six of the 1990 ‘Ordinance of the Conveyance and Transfer 
of Land-Use Rights’, land-use rights can be renewed upon payment of another land-use premium 
when the term expires.29  The law effectively turns granted land-use contracts into perpetual 
leasehold interests.  However, it is unclear whether the land value at the time of renewal would 
be determined by the market from a public bidding process or follow a benchmark price set by 
the local land authority.  It should be noted that the law assumes all improvements upon the land 
including all buildings and fixtures revert back to the government without compensation at the 
end of the term if the land-use contract is not renewed.30 
 
                                                 
28 “China Real Estate Market,” March 2004, China Windows. 
 
29 Li, Ling Hin, “Privatization of the Urban Land Market in Shanghai,” 1996, Hong Kong University Press, Hong 
Kong. 
 
30 Kaufman, Ezekiel, “Effective Land-Use Policy and Legislation in China: The Key to the Future of Urban 
Development of the World’s Most Populous Nation,” 1st Quarter 2004, Holland & Knight News – Property Writes, 
8, 1, 12-13. 
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1.4  Identifying Real Options 
Dissatisfied with the ‘Net Present Value’ rule to investment decisions in ignoring the 
irreversibility and the flexibility with respect to the timing of investments, many economists and 
mathematicians have focused on the investigation of options as a new theoretical approach to 
capital investment decision of firms since the late 1960’s.  According to Geltner and Miller 
(2001), an option is the right without obligation to obtain something of value upon the payment 
for giving up something else of value.  The theory suggests that it will usually not make sense to 
invest in a project that has a small positive net present value (NPV) as it is quantified in the 
typical corporate budgeting application.  Instead, it will usually make more sense in the corporate 
context to wait until the NPV is substantially positive before investing.31   
 
Option Valuation Theory (OVT) is a body of theory and methodology first introduced to 
appraise stock options and warrants commonly traded in several big exchanges.  The most 
famous development of OVT was the publication of an option valuation model by Black, 
Scholes and Merton (1973).  The Black-Scholes-Merton model turned what would otherwise be 
a guessing game into a mathematical science.  Since then, OVT has virtually changed the 
practice of investment, and revolutionized corporate finance industries.   
 
Aside from its contribution to financial sectors, OVT has also offered profound implications to 
the real estate industry.  Referring to the definition of options noted earlier, since the underlying 
assets (either obtained or given up) are real properties, the application of OVT to real estate is 
commonly referred to as Real Options Theory (ROT).   
                                                 
31 Geltner, David and Norman G. Miller, “Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investments,” 2001, South-Western 
Publishing, Mason, Ohio. 
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OVT addresses three of the most important elements that determine optimal investment 
decisions: irreversibility of investment, uncertainty over future rewards and the flexibility of 
investment timing.  Given the irreversibility of construction, the uncertainty over future cash 
flow from the property and the flexibility of development timing, it is possible to explore China’s 
real estate system from a real options perspective.  Recalling the definition of options from the 
above introduction, an option is the right without obligation to obtain something of value upon 
the payment for giving up something else of value.  In a simplified residential development 
system in China, once a developer pays the local authority a land grant fee in exchange for land-
use rights to a particular property, he has ‘the right without obligation’ to develop the property at 
an optimal time within a two time frame dictated by law.  The land grant fee can thus be seen as 
‘option price’ paid to the government based on market value.  Furthermore, the ‘right’ the 
developer obtains can be expended to a series of two compound call options: 
 
1) Tenant Resettlement.  
Upon acquisition of land-use rights of a property from the state, the developer has 
the option to negotiate the payment of resettlement costs to sitting tenants before 
land clearance.  The strike price is the cost function of tenant resettlement.  For 
simplicity of analysis, this option has an assumed maturity of one year. 
 
2) Construction Commencement. 
Once the issues of tenant resettlement and infrastructure financing have been 
addressed, the developer has a second option to commence construction to avoid 
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penalties.  The strike price is the cost of construction.  This option matures at year 
2 according anti land speculation laws. 
 
The right to renewal land-use rights can also be seen as an option from the end user’s point of 
view.  Assuming the developer successfully transfers land-use rights to end users at the end of 
building completion, end users have the option to renew their land-use contracts one year prior to 
the termination date.  The strike price would be the new land grant fee based on future land 
market value.  This option to renew in a residential development matures at year 69.  (However, 
it is outside the scope of this proposed analysis, therefore will not be covered by the current 
thesis.) 
 
1.5  Research Objectives 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction, rising land transaction prices in the last couple of years 
have benefited Shanghai’s government in fueling much of the social developments on the local 
level.  With a relatively inexpensive labor market in China, land expenditure represents an 
increasingly large portion of the total development cost structure.  The aim of this thesis is to 
explore China’s real estate system from an academic real options perspective.  Using a standard 
option-based model of investment, the thesis hopes to provide insights to the value of land-use 
rights, tenant compensation and the behavior of development industry. 
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Chapter Two  Literature Review and Statement of Propositions 
To further our understanding of China’s land market, the subsequent chapter is organized into 
three sections.  The first section reviews publications on land valuation and development 
practices in China to establish a basis of further analysis.  The second section examines current 
literature on the empirical testing of land option pricing models.  Lastly, the final section of the 
chapter states research propositions in more detail. 
 
2.1  Land Valuation and Development Practices in China 
In one of the most detailed accounts, Li (1996) traces the formation of China’s urban land 
market, and examines the basic valuation principle of ‘cost production functions’ under a 
socialist ideology.  He tests Shanghai’s market land pricing behavior by comparing actual land 
transaction prices achieved from 1992-1993 to the residual land values simulated using a 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model.   
 
The empirical testing results from his regression analysis find that market prices for land-use 
rights differ from the theoretical residual land values.  Although the nature of Shanghai’s land 
market is not dissimilar to that of the market economy, non-market factors such as politics 
strongly influence actual land price behavior.  Li concludes that theoretical market principles 
governing land prices are not applicable in a transitional socialist economy such as Shanghai’s at 
the time of the analysis.  
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The Chinese approach of controlling market land prices speeds up development activities, 
without creating an excessively high housing cost.  However, Li projects that the low level of 
future property cash flow will only delay the redevelopment of property since the land value of 
the cleared site would not be high enough to justify redevelopment.   
 
Figure 2.1 Urban Dereliction due to Under-Estimation of Site Value 
(Source: Li, Lin Hin, “Privatization of Urban Land in Shanghai,” 1996) 
 
Li further concludes that the irrational pricing behavior observed in the market is only  
temporary.  The pricing of land-use rights will eventually converge to a residual land value as the 
overall economic environment becomes more mature and transparent.1 
 
Based on the fundamental principles of modern finance, Wang (2003) introduces the NPV 
investment decision rule and examines methods of calculating residential real estate development 
returns in China.  Using the case study of a resort development in Hainan, Wang outlines general 
procedures for examining expected returns on real estate development investments. He finds that  
inconsistencies in the investment returns support the application of NPV decision rule.  Wang 
                                                 
1 Li, Ling Hin, “Privatization of the Urban Land Market in Shanghai,” 1996, Hong Kong University Press, Hong 
Kong. 
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concludes that the current practices fail to reflect unique market features such as time-to-build, 
intensive use of debt financing, and phased risk regimes.2   
 
2.2  Empirical Testing of the Land Option Pricing Model 
Using data on 2700 land transactions in Seattle, Quigg (1993) provides empirical information 
about the option-based value of land, relative to its intrinsic value and its market price.  She finds 
a consistent positive premia of 1 to 30 percent in these sample market prices, with a mean value 
of 6 percent option (time) premium differences between the intrinsic value and the option model.  
Quigg concludes that the option model has explanatory power for predicting transactions prices 
over and above the intrinsic value.  Furthermore, the option to wait has value.3 
 
Capozza and Li (1994) analyze the decision of land redevelopment in an optimal-stopping 
framework, leaving the level of capital investment and the degree of density as choice variables.  
They find a strong relationship between the intensity of development to the timing of investment, 
taxes and project values.  Furthermore, simultaneous optimization of time and the level of capital 
investment delays development decisions.4   
 
                                                 
2 Wang, Qian, “Returns on Chinese Residential Development Projects: A Practical Investment Evaluation Procedure 
Developed for the Analysis of Chinese Residential Development Projects based on Modern Financial Economic 
Norms,” September 2003, Master’s Thesis, Center for Real Estate, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
3 Quigg, Laura, “Empirical Testing of Real Option-Pricing Models,” June 1993, The Journal of Finance, 48, 2, 621-
640. 
 
4 Capozza, Dennis R. and Yumin Li, “The Intensity and Timing of Investment: The Case of Land,” September 1994, 
The American Economic Review, 84, 4, 889-904. 
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Holland, Ott and Riddiough (2000) examine the role of uncertainty in investment.  They use 
commercial real estate data and a structural model of industry asset market equilibrium to sort 
out uncertainty’s role in investment.  Holland el al. find that results favor predictions of the 
option-based model, which suggest that irreversibility and delay are important considerations to 
investors.5 
 
Yao and Pretorius (2004) empirically test real options in the Hong Kong residential real estate 
market using data from completed development projects.  Focusing on the period between land 
acquisition and construction start time, Yao and Pretorius contrast the differences between the 
land conversion premiums calculated by the residual value method to the premiums predicted 
using the Samuelson and McKean (1965) option pricing model.  The results from case studies 
show that the Hong Kong government has consistently under valued land in lease transactions to 
developers.  The development timing behaviors from the same case studies also conform to 
predictions made by the option valuation theory.6 
 
Cunningham (2004) tests the two main predictions of real options with respect to land 
developments: land prices and investment timing.  Using detailed micro-level data sets from 
King County, Washington, the option-based analysis finds clear evidence of housing price 
uncertainty to delay the timing of construction and to increase the value of vacant land.7   
                                                 
5 Holland, A. Steven, Steven H. Ott and Timothy J. Riddiough, “The Role of Uncertainty in Investment: An 
Examination of Competing Investment Models using Commercial Real Estate Data,” 2000, Real Estate Economics, 
28, 1, 33-64. 
 
6 Yao, Huimin and Frederik Pretorius, “Empirical Testing of Real Options in the Hong Kong Residential Real Estate 
Market,” 2004, Research Paper, University of Hong Kong. 
 
7 Cunningham, Christopher R., “Housing Price Uncertainty, Timing of Development and Vacant Land Prices: 
Evidence of Real Options in Seattle,” May 2004, Working Paper, Department of Economics, Syracuse University. 
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2.3  Statement of Propositions 
Based on reviews of the empirical testing of real options theory literature, we can see that past 
analysis primarily focuses on the relationship between option premium and the market value of 
land.  The conclusions have largely been drawn on the miss-pricing of land, arguing that most 
investors do not take into account the time-value of delaying a development, resulting in 
transaction prices that do not reflect the true option values of the parcels.  The empirical testing 
of real options theory on Shanghai’s land transaction data is most likely to result in similar 
findings.  The ensuing contribution to the advancements of real options theory is limited. 
 
Instead, this thesis will assume the land-use rights transaction prices by way of the public land 
tendering process in Shanghai to be the true option values of land.  Similar to Yao (2004), this 
thesis focuses on the period between land acquisition and the construction start time.  As noted 
earlier in the introduction, negotiations of tenants’ resettlement compensation often result in 
disputes, invoking high levels of public outage, which are feared to generate potential political 
challenges to the Communist Party.  Therefore, the formulation of a systematic valuation of 
tenants’ compensation is of great interest not only to the real estate industry, but more 
importantly, to the Chinese government.   
 
This thesis will introduce a compound option model for the valuation of residential land-use 
rights and analyze the market values of tenants’ compensation.  Using Shanghai’s residential 
land tender transaction data from 2003, the proposed compound option model will analyze the 
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corresponding maximum values of tenants’ leasehold interests implied in the transaction prices, 
and help to explain the development behaviors in terms of the timing of construction.   
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Chapter Three Methodology and Data Analysis 
3.1  Methodology 
The method to derive the value of land-use rights in Shanghai follows in principle the binomial 
process that underlies the option pricing theory.  As described previously in the introduction, the 
state owns all land in China and sells the right to use land to developers.  The land conveyance 
fee (land-use transaction price) plus tenants’ resettlement compensation and infrastructure fees 
paid to the local government are assumed to be the total market value of land.  The land 
conveyance fee is determined by the market through a public tendering process, and has been 
published with details by the Shanghai authority since 1993.  In my research, I assume the 
tendering process to be efficient and the winning bid to be the maximum price a developer can 
rationally pay for the land-use right. 
 
In estimating these theoretical values of leasehold interests to the tenants and infrastructure fees 
to the Shanghai government, one needs to construct a compound binomial model with two 
distinct call options and strike prices.  The first call option is the decision to relocate sitting 
tenants.  It is assumed to mature at year one, with a strike price equals to the tenants’ 
resettlement compensation and infrastructure fees paid to the local government.  The second call 
option is the decision to start construction.  It is assumed to mature at year two, conforming to 
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China’s anti land speculation regulations.  Strike pricing for this second option is the cost 
construction. 
 
The land transaction prices from 2003 were assumed to be the maximum prices developers could 
rationally pay for the land-use rights.  By setting them equal to the values of the first option, one 
can then back out the maximum strike prices (resettlement compensation plus infrastructure fees) 
the developers could pay to avoid negative-NPV (including option value) investment decisions. 
 
3.1.1 Binomial Model 
The basic binomial model chosen to calculate the option values of Shanghai’s residential land-
use rights is as follows:1 
 
1) Consider an underlying asset with value S, and a call with strike price X. 
 
2) Using implied asset volatility δ to calculate u and d, the value of the 
underlying asset at the call’s maturity can take only two values: uS (“up”, S 
multiply by variable u) and dS (“down”, S multiply by variable d). 
   uS 
    
S    
    
   dS 
    
 
           Period 0         Period 1 
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3) At maturity, the call can take two values:  
[ ]XuSCu −= ,0max      (1a) 
[ ]XdSCd −= ,0max       (1b) 
  q Cu 
    
C    
    
  1-q Cd 
    
 
           Period 0         Period 1  
 
4) The price of the call today is a discounted value of Cu and Cd weighted by the 
probability q and (1-q).   
r
CdqqCuC +
−+=
1
)1(
     (2) 
 
3.1.2 Compound Option Model 
With these simple equations, one can  construct a compound option model in a two period world 
to better represent the real estate development process in Shanghai.  A compound option is an 
option on another option.  Using the definition of option defined earlier, the first option is the 
right without obligation to obtain something of value (second option) upon the payment for 
giving up something else of value (first strike price). 
 
1) Consider an underlying asset with value S, a second call with strike price 
(Construction cost) X,” and a first call with strike price (resettlement cost) X’. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Pavlova, A., D. Vayanos, “Derivative II. Options,” 2002 
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2) Using implied asset volatility δ to calculate u and d, the value of the 
underlying asset at year one can take only two values: uS (“up”, S multiply by 
variable u) and dS (“down”, S multiply by variable d).  At year two, uS can take 
two more values: uuS (“up up”, uS multiply by variable u) and udS (“up down”, 
uS multiply by variable d).  The same applies dS: values udS (“up down”, dS 
multiply by variable u) and ddS (“down down”, dS multiply by variable d). 
      uuS 
       
   uS    
       
S      udS 
       
   dS    
       
      ddS 
       
 
     Period 0      Period 1          Period 2 
 
3) At year two, maturity of the second option, the call can take three values:  
[ ]",0max" XuuSuuC −=     (3a) 
[ ]",0max" XudSudC −=     (3b) 
[ ]",0max" XddSddC −=     (3c) 
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     q C”uu 
       
  q C”u    
       
C”     1-q, q C”ud 
       
  1-q C”d    
       
     1-q C”dd 
       
 
     Period 0      Period 1          Period 2 
 
4) At year one, price of the second call C”u is a discounted value of C”uu and 
C”ud weighted by the probability q and (1-q).  Price of C”d is calculated the same 
way. 
r
udCquuqCuC +
−+=
1
")1(""
   (4a) 
r
ddCqudqCdC +
−+=
1
")1(""
   (4b) 
 
5) The price of the second call today is a discounted value of C”u and C”d 
weighted by the probability q and (1-q).  
r
dCquqCC +
−+=
1
")1(""
    (5) 
 
6) At year one, maturity of the first option, the call can take two values:  
[ ]'",0max' XuCuC −=     (6a) 
[ ]'",0max' XdCdC −=     (6b) 
Chapter 3 
38 
  q C’u 
    
C’    
    
  1-q C’d 
    
 
           Period 0         Period 1  
 
The value of C’u being the maximum value of 0, or the value of C”u from the 
second option minus the first option strike price (resettlement compensation) X’.  
The same calculation is applied to C’d.  The value of C’d being the maximum 
value of 0, or the value of C”d from the second option minus the first option strike 
price (resettlement compensation) X’.   
 
7) The price of the first call today is a discounted value of C’u and C’d weighted 
by the probability q and (1-q). 
r
dCquqCC +
−+=
1
')1(''
    (7) 
 
8) Assuming the tendering process to be efficient and the winning bid to be the 
maximum price a developer can rationally pay for the land-use right.  We can set 
the transaction price to be the value of C’, and then back out the maximum strike 
prices (resettlement compensation plus infrastructure fees) X’ of the first option 
which the developer could pay to the local government to avoid a negative-NPV 
(including option value) investment decision. 
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The actual compound option model we use to estimate the value of residential land-use rights in 
Shanghai is an expanded version of this simplified two period model to 24 periods, representing 
the first 24 months of real estate development process.  (See Appendix C)   
 
3.1.3 Assumptions 
This section will identify the following basic assumptions that go into the compound option 
model calculations: 
 
1) Risk-free rate (rf) 
The monthly continual compounding risk-free interest rate is assumed to be 0.19 
percent.  Given that the bond market in China is generally dominated by 
commercial banks, the major investment channel for individual investors is 
savings account.  Therefore, an appropriate monthly risk free return is taken from 
the average short term two-year CD rate issued by the People’s Bank of China in 
2003. 
 
2) Volatility (δ) 
The monthly volatility of the underlying residential property market returns in 
Shanghai is assumed to be 6.46 percent, based on the Shanghai Property Index 
published by the Chinese Real Estate Index System (CREIS) since January 1995.  
To capture the implied monthly volatility in the property index, we first estimate 
the biennial standard deviation of the index to be 31.65 percent.  According to 
Geltner and Miller (2001), if we suppose property value follows a ‘random walk’ 
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through time (whether the value rose or fell during the past year does not tell you 
anything about whether it will rise or fall next year, like the flipping of a coin), 
then it is a mathematical fact that the volatility grows with the square root of the 
time over which it is measured.2  Following the method outlined by Geltner and 
Miller (2001), we take the biennial volatility of 31.65 percent and divide it by the 
square root of 24 to derive an implied monthly volatility of 6.46 percent.  (See 
Appendix B) 
 
3) Dividend Yield (y) 
The yield variable from the underlying property is estimated to be 0.60 percent on 
a monthly basis.  In the case of real estate, since real property generates income in 
the form of rent, it can be directly observed from the residential housing market.  
It is calculated by identifying an average rental rate per square meter of apartment 
and dividing it by the average price of residential property per square meter.  In 
the case of Shanghai, observed average apartment rental rate is estimated at 30 
RMB per square meter per month, and the average asset price for a new 
residential building is assumed to be 5000 RMB per square meter. 
priceasset  avg
rate rentalmonthly  avg=y     (8) 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Geltner, David and Norman G. Miller, “Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investments,” 2001, South-Western 
Publishing, Mason, Ohio. 
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4) Up (u) 
Variable u is assumed to be 1.0667.  The “up” multiplier is calculated using the 
monthly asset volatility derived earlier, and dt, which equal the option maturity 
divided by the binomial lattice steps.  In the case of our compound option model, 
since the second option matures at month 24 and the binomial lattice also has 24 
steps, dt = 1. 
)dt*volatilityexp(=u     (9) 
 
5) Down (d) 
Variable d is assumed to be 0.9374.  The “down” multiplier is simply the inverse 
of variable u. 
u
d 1=
         (10) 
 
6) Risk-neutral Probability (q) 
Risk-neutral probability q of an ”up” move is assumed to be 49.68 percent.  It is 
calculated using a continual compounding risk-free interest rate rf, cash yield rate 
y, step time dt, “up” variable u, and “down” variable d. 
du
ddtyrfq −
−−= )*)exp((
    (11) 
 
7) Asset Value (V) 
An estimated average value of a new residential development in Shanghai is 
assumed to be 5,000 RMB per square meter.  This figure is estimated by cross 
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referencing sales data published by the Shanghai government in 2003, CREIS 
Shanghai Residential Property Index, and local development consultants. 
 
8) Option 2 Strike Price (X construction) 
The strike Price (X construction) for the second option is assumed to be 2,500 
RMB per square meter for residential development in Shanghai in 2003.  This 
figure includes all material and labor cost, estimated by local development 
consultants.  Construction cost is assumed to be stable during the 24 months 
period covered by our options model. 
 
9) Option 1 Strike Price (X resettlement) 
The strike Price (X resettlement) for the first option is assumed to be tenant 
resettlement and infrastructure fees paid to local Shanghai government.  In the 
case of our compound option model, it is the critical value, projected by inversing 
the flow of options calculation starting from the price of the option today. 
 
3.1.4 Land Tendering Database 
Land tendering transaction prices from Shanghai have been published by the Shanghai 
Municipality since 1988.  The particular data set for the period of 2003 to 2004 was obtained 
from CB Richard Ellis Shanghai office.  This set of records includes 258 transactions covering 
Residential, Office, Retail and Mix-Use properties.  Screening of master data set results in 93 
qualified residential land sale records in 13 districts: 南 区汇 , 嘉定区, 奉 区贤 , 宝山区, 崇明县, 徐 区汇 , 
普陀区, 浦区杨 , 松江区, 浦 新区东 , 金山区, 行区闵 , and 青浦区. 
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The final set of data represents land transactions for residential granted land-use rights through 
the public tendering process in Shanghai during the period of 2003 to 2004.  (See Appendix A)  
The structure of the data set is outlined as follows: 
Column 1  Serial number of the transaction 
Column 2  District of property 
Column 3  Land parcel serial number 
Column 4  Total area of land parcel 
Column 5  Floor area ratio (FAR) 
Column 6  Total allowable floor area 
Column 7  Land lease term (70-year for residential use) 
Column 8  Date of tender 
Column 9  Total land tendering price (Total conveyance fee) 
Column 10 Tendering price per square meter 
 
3.2  Data Analysis 
3.2.1 Tenant Resettlement Compensation 
On the aggregate level, application of the compound option model using the land transaction data 
from 2003 with an average land conveyance fee of 1,217 RMB per square meter as the current 
option price yields a corresponding option strike price of 1,283 RMB per square meter.  It 
represents the maximum value of tenant resettlement and infrastructure components of the total 
land value a developer can rationally pay to avoid a negative-NPV (including option value) 
investment decision.  
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The model suggests a resettlement and infrastructure compensation of about 51 percent of total 
land value (conveyance fee plus resettlement and infrastructure cost), or 26 percent of the 
underlying asset value upon sales of the residential development.   
 
On the individual land transaction level, projected resettlement prices exhibit significant 
fluctuations from the mean value.  Further analysis of the model output reveals that the projected 
resettlement costs generally deviate by districts.  The results may be explained by the 
differentials in the location value of land.   
 
Figure 3.1 Projected Resettlement Cost   Projected Resettlement Cost as % of Total Land Value 
 
Due to the lack of tenants’ resettlement and infrastructural compensation data corresponding to 
Shanghai’s actual granted land-use rights transaction records in 2003, results from this options 
pricing model can only be tested analytically.  This model suggests a more rigorous land 
valuation technique that is based on the Real Options Theory.  On the macro level, the model 
addresses the issue of tenant resettlement and infrastructural compensation in the real estate 
development process.  Under the assumption that land tendering price is only part of the total 
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land value, the model suggests a rational value for tenants’ compensation plus infrastructure fees 
for residential developments in Shanghai would be in the range of 26 percent of total asset price 
on average. 
 
Compared to the observations made on urban land in Shanghai by Li (1996), which set tenants’ 
‘invisible leasehold interests’ at 80 percent of total price of land in 1993,3 this model puts the 
current figure at 51 percent of total land value.  The proportional differences in the underlying 
freehold interest of land could be explained by the advances in real estate regulations and the 
expected growth of the housing market. 
 
According to Geltner (1989), reforms in government policies and real estate regulations that 
reduce uncertainty may tend to reduce the land values and stimulate more development.4  
Chinese approach pushes the market demand higher and thus speeds up market activities, 
reflected in the growing numbers of land-use right transactions in past few years.  While the 
reduction in uncertainty acts to reduce land value, the rising residential land price in Shanghai 
may be explained by an increase in future expected value of the underlying asset.  In other 
words, expectation has out-weighted uncertainty in the valuation of residential land market in 
Shanghai.   
 
                                                 
3 Li, Ling Hin, “Privatization of the Urban Land Market in Shanghai,” 1996, Hong Kong University Press, Hong 
Kong. 
 
4 Geltner, David, “On the Use of the Financial Option Pricing Model to Value and Explain Vacant Urban Land,” 
1989, Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, 17, 2, 142-158. 
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3.2.2 Development Timing 
Further analysis on the binomial model illustrates an immediate exercise of the resettlement 
option, which suggests the option premium is marginal under 2003’s market conditions.  In other 
words, assuming a monthly asset volatility of 6.46 percent, and a dividend yield of 0.60 percent, 
the rational investment decision would be to start residential development immediately.  (See 
Appendix G)  A sensitivity analysis shows the asset volatility to be less of a factor than dividend 
yields in the development timing of land.  Any monthly asset volatility less than 7.87 percent 
would result in immediate development to maximize NPV.  Therefore, even in the case where 
the actual monthly volatility of 1.12 percent is applied to the model, a decision for the immediate 
exercise of the resettlement option would not be effected. 
 
On the other hand, changes in the yield component of the risk-neutral probability calculation 
would significantly alter the timing of developments.  In cases where the monthly dividend yield 
is less than 0.38 percent, developments would be delayed to maximize NPV.  As dividend yield 
decreases to 0.06 percent, development timing is prolonged to the maturity of the resettlement 
and construction options.  As one can see, an exclusion of the dividend yields in the risk-neutral 
probability calculation would significantly delay the development timing.  (See Appendix L) 
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Chapter Four  Conclusion 
China’s shift away from welfare housing has generated tremendous demand for private home 
ownership since the early 1990’s.  The resulting growth in the housing market has fueled the 
country’s transformation towards a market economy.  However, the transition has not occurred 
without problems.  As identified earlier in the introduction, one of the main issues the 
government has been grappling with is the dispute between developers and residents over low 
rates of resettlement compensation.  Even though the national demolition regulation clearly 
states that developers must pay evictees compensation equal to the full market value of their 
properties, the law provides little guidance in the calculation of the true market value of tenants’ 
leasehold interests. 
 
Human Rights Watch reported in 2004 that residents have few options after their properties have 
been granted to developers.  Resettlement compensation is negotiated either through the 
Demolition and Eviction Management Departments within each municipal government, or 
unilaterally by developers or the demolition companies.  In most cases, tenants’ compensation is 
set to be far below market value.  As land prices rise in urban areas while the displaced residents 
receive compensation below market value, they may be priced out of the area where they had 
been living and forced to resettle in fringe neighborhoods where employment is scarce.1 
 
                                                 
1 Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenants’ Rights Movement in China,” March 2004, Human Rights Watch, 
16, 4 (C). 
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As one can see, the issue of resettlement compensation in the current land disposal system has 
broader macro-level implications that affect the wealth disparity between urbanites and rural 
residents.  It has not only introduced additional investment risks to the development industry, but 
also presented a major challenge to the socialist ideology.   
 
This thesis offers a compound option model to analyze the existing land disposal system in 
China.  Assuming that Shanghai’s land market is efficient and the market values of land-use 
rights converge to the option values of land, the model identifies the maximum values of tenants’ 
resettlement and infrastructure components of the total land values, (the maximum price 
developers can pay to avoid negative-NPV investment decisions).  In other words, if we assume 
that the land tendering price (conveyance fee) is only part of the total land value, then the 
resulting land cost function should represent theoretical maximum value of sitting tenants’ 
leasehold interests (including infrastructure fees).  In the case where tenant resettlement is not 
needed, the entire land cost function should revert back to the local government for the 
construction of public infrastructure.  Compared to the observations on urban land transactions in 
Shanghai by Li (1996), which set tenants’ ‘invisible leasehold interest’ at 80 percent of total 
price of land in 1993,2 this thesis puts the current figure at about 50 percent of total land value. 
 
According to the compound option model, the price of land-use rights exhibits an inverse 
relationship to the tenants’ resettlement compensation.  It implies that as the price of the state’s 
freehold interest on land increases, the maximum compensation of tenants’ leasehold interest a 
developer can pay to avoid a negative-NPV investment decision decreases.  Base on this set of 
                                                 
2 Li, Ling Hin, “Privatization of the Urban Land Market in Shanghai,” 1996, Hong Kong University Press, Hong 
Kong. 
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relationships, it is only ‘rational’ for developers to decrease tenants’ compensation, as land 
tendering prices (state’s freehold interests) converge to the theoretical residual land values. 
 
However, since the implied ‘leasehold interests’ given to tenants by the state before any granting 
of land-use rights to developers are assumed to be perpetual, the present value of the discounted 
future leasehold interests should theoretically be much higher than the reversionary value of the 
state’s freehold interest.  Discrepancies between the theoretical values of tenant’s leasehold 
interests and the realized compensation are increasing at an alarming rate base on findings of this 
thesis.   
 
Even though rising momentum in the land transaction prices has fueled much of the social 
development in Shanghai, it has not benefited sitting tenants.  The Chinese government’s reform 
efforts in making the land disposal system more efficient seem to have only exacerbated the 
dispute between developers and residents over low rates of resettlement compensation.  
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, China’s primary land market is monopolized by the state and 
there are restrictions on the transfer of land-use rights among private developers.3   It is the 
recommendation of this thesis that the Chinese government reexamines the existing land 
conveyance system to formally include tenants’ resettlement compensation and infrastructural 
fees as part of the land-use rights bidding package.  This thesis further recommends legal 
recognitions of tenants’ ‘invisible leasehold interests’ to strengthen their rights to the land on 
which they reside. 
                                                 
3 Li, Ling Hin, “Privatization of Urban Land in Shanghai,” 1996, Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong. 
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In the short run, it may be ideologically acceptable for Chinese authorities to create an active 
land market at the expense of sitting tenants during the period of economic transition as 
leasehold interests have never been clearly defined in the past.  As the real estate market 
becomes more efficient, issues of proper resettlement compensation and forceful tenant evictions 
place increasing pressure on the local government, as the high levels of public outrage are feared 
to generate potential political challenges to the Communist Party.4  Therefore, addressing 
tenants’ leasehold interests is not only central to the reforms of real estate industry, but more 
importantly, it is fundamental to the stability of China’s governance.  
 
                                                 
4 Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenants’ Rights Movement in China,” March 2004, Human Rights Watch, 
16, 4 (C). 
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20030605 ��� ���5�—A 279,100 0.7 195,370 70 03/10/15�9-13� 314,250,000 1608 
20030617 ��� ���2����� 20,833 1.5 31,250 70 03/10/15�9-13� 105,010,000 3360 
20030620 ���� ����180�181�182� 193,900 1.2 232,680 70 03/10/15�9-13� 145,000,000 623 
20030621 ���� ������22� 81,000 1.2 97,200 70 03/10/15�9-13� 85,050,000 875 
20030701 ��� ���1����� 38,667 2.2 85,067 70 03/11/25�9-13� 132,236,000 1554 
20030703 ��� ���A����� 73,503 1.25 91,879 70 03/11/25�9-13� 18,955,200 206 
20030704 ��� ���������� 33,472 1.2 40,166 70 03/11/25�9-13� 8,435,000 210 
20030709 ��� ���2003-11��� 59,675 1.2 71,610 70 03/11/25�9-13� 37,582,800 525 
20030710 ��� ����������� 10,924 2.5 27,310 70 03/11/25�9-13� 22,632,000 829 
20030713 ��� ���3����� 40,483 1.0 40,483 70 03/11/25�9-13� 15,200,000 375 
20030714 ��� ������� 53,262 1.1 58,588 70 03/11/26�9-13� 42,341,800 723 
20030720 ��� ���3# 196,828 2.2 433,022 70 03/11/25�9-13� 560,959,500 1295 
20030721 ��� ���4# 8,974.8 1.66 14,898 70 03/11/25�9-13� 28,540,000 1916 
20030722 ��� ���5# 51,263.6 1.60 82,022 70 03/11/26�9-13� 141,890,000 1730 
20030723 ��� ���6# 29,475.1 1.3 38,318 70 03/11/26�9-13� 61,897,000 1615 
20030727 ��� ���10����� 30,025 1.2 36,030 70 03/11/25�9-13� 23,880,000 663 
20030728 ��� ���11����� 50,000 0.8 40,000 70 03/11/25�9-13� 45,700,000 1143 
20030729 ��� ���12����� 47,982 1.2 57,578 70 03/11/25�9-13� 48,960,000 850 
20030730 ��� ���14����� 44,117 1.0 44,117 70 03/11/25�9-13� 34,950,000 792 
20030731 ��� ���15����� 80,000 1.0 80,000 70 03/11/26�9-13� 76,160,000 952 
20030732 ��� ���16����� 60,000 1.1 66,000 70 03/11/26�9-13� 20,860,000 316 
20030733 ��� ���17����� 76,272 1.0 76,272 70 03/11/26�9-13� 29,580,000 388 
20030734 ��� ���18����� 74,625 1.0 74,625 70 03/11/26�9-13� 29,092,100 390 
20030735 ��� ���19����� 71,327 0.6 42,796 70 03/11/26�9-13� 99,180,000 2317 
20030806 ��� 128� 19,076 2.56 48,835 70 03/12/19�9-13� 157,920,000 3234 
20030810 ��� ���2����� 334,591 1.25 418,239 70 03/12/17�9-13� 368,670,000 881 
20030811 ��� ���3����� 118,328 1.4 165,659 70 03/12/18�9-13� 218,330,000 1318 
20030812 ��� ���2003-12��� 16,567 1.2 19,880 70 03/12/18�9-13� 24,626,600 1239 
20030813 ��� ���2003-13��� 131,462.8 1.2 157,755 70 03/12/18�9-13� 252,400,000 1600 
20030814 ��� ���2003-14��� 74,124 1.0 74,124 70 03/12/18�9-13� 42,372,000 572 
20030815 ��� ���2003-15��� 59,511 1.2 71,413 70 03/12/18�9-13� 41,955,300 588 
20030818 ��� ���2003-18��� 100,002 1.2 120,002 70 03/12/19�9-13� 195,000,000 1625 
20030819 ��� ���2003-19��� 7,223.2 1.44 10,401 70 03/12/19�9-13� 4,450,000 428 
20030820 ��� ��������E-8 142,868 1.1 157,155 70 03/12/17�9-13� 118,000,000 751 
20030821 ��� ��������B-7 175,047 1.1 192,552 70 03/12/17�9-13� 145,000,000 753 
20030822 ��� ���3����� 76,972 1.1 84,669 70 03/12/18�9-13� 61,193,800 723 
20030823 ��� ������� 19,981 1.1 21,979 70 03/12/18�9-13� 10,550,000 480 
20030824 ��� ���20����� 13,327.7 1.3 17,326 70 03/12/17�9-13� 11,350,000 655 
20030825 ��� ���21����� 8,441.1 1.35 11,395 70 03/12/17�9-13� 6,080,000 534 
20030826 ��� ���22����� 7,822.7 2.0 15,645 70 03/12/17�9-13� 6,571,040 420 
20030827 ��� ���23����� 26,739.5 1.2 32,087 70 03/12/17�9-13� 25,263,000 787 
20030828 ��� ���15-16����� 274267 0.8 219414 70 03/12/17�8-10� 329,130,000 1500 
20030829 ��� ���10����� 108986 0.8 87189 70 03/12/17�8-10� 130,780,000 1500 
20030831 ��� ���13-14����� 234,482 0.8 187,586 70 03/12/18�8-10� 270,130,000 1440 
20030833 ��� ���32-2����� 47,314 1.0 47,314 70 03/12/18�8-10� 60,325,350 1275 
20030834 ��� ���30����� 115144 0.8 92115 70 03/12/17�8-10� 152,950,000 1660 
20030835 ��� ���18����� 114,098 0.8 91,278 70 03/12/19�8-10� 145,475,000 1594 
20030837 ��� ��������2����� 259,055 1.6 414,488 70 03/12/19�8-10� 540,000,000 1303 
20030838 ��� ���1����� 53,215.7 1.65 87,806 70 03/12/17�9-13� 142,190,000 1619 
20030839 ��� ���2����� 10,234.5 2.3 23,539 70 03/12/17�9-13� 6,915,150 294 
20030840 ��� ���3����� 33,302.2 1.35 44,958 70 03/12/17�9-13� 75,930,000 1689 
20030841 ��� ���4����� 76,458.1 1.6 122,333 70 03/12/18�9-13� 219,050,000 1791 
20030842 ��� ���5����� 60,102.8 1.4 84,144 70 03/12/18�9-13� 162,276,700 1929 
20030843 ��� ���6����� 29,425.1 1.85 54,436 70 03/12/18�9-13� 68,413,300 1257 
20030844 ��� ���7����� 5,976.8 2.2 13,149 70 03/12/19�9-13� 24,385,200 1855 
20030845 ��� ���8����� 106,431 1.08 114,945 70 03/12/19�9-13� 88,280,000 768 
20030846 ��� ���9����� 165,890.1 1.5 248,835 70 03/12/19�9-13� 460,345,000 1850 
20030847 ��� ���104����� 22,459 1.4 31,443 70 03/12/18�9-13� 74,116,000 2357 
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�� Date �� Index �� (+ / -) �� Index �� (+ / -) �� Index �� (+ / -)
5/1/2004 1251 1.38% 1201 1.44% 1220 0.74%
4/1/2004 1234 1.82% 1184 1.89% 1211 1.25%
3/1/2004 1212 1.42% 1162 1.48% 1196 1.10%
2/1/2004 1195 1.44% 1145 1.51% 1183 1.20%
1/1/2004 1178 0.51% 1128 0.45% 1169 0.95%
12/1/2003 1172 1.82% 1123 1.91% 1158 1.05%
11/1/2003 1151 3.88% 1102 -4.84% 1146 1.42%
10/1/2003 1108 1.93% 1158 11.56% 1130 1.53%
9/1/2003 1087 2.26% 1038 2.47% 1113 0.72%
8/1/2003 1063 1.72% 1013 1.71% 1105 1.19%
7/1/2003 1045 4.29% 996 4.51% 1092 1.49%
6/1/2003 1002 2.24% 953 2.47% 1076 0.65%
5/1/2003 980 1.98% 930 2.09% 1069 1.04%
4/1/2003 961 1.69% 911 1.79% 1058 0.86%
3/1/2003 945 2.16% 895 1.82% 1049 3.25%
2/1/2003 925 2.55% 879 2.81% 1016 0.69%
1/1/2003 902 1.23% 855 1.30% 1009 0.90%
12/1/2002 891 1.60% 844 1.69% 1000 1.01%
11/1/2002 877 1.15% 830 1.22% 990 0.61%
10/1/2002 867 1.52% 820 1.61% 984 0.72%
9/1/2002 854 1.55% 807 1.64% 977 0.62%
8/1/2002 841 1.45% 794 1.53% 971 1.15%
7/1/2002 829 0.73% 782 0.51% 960 0.73%
6/1/2002 823 1.35% 778 1.43% 953 1.06%
5/1/2002 812 1.25% 767 1.32% 943 1.07%
4/1/2002 802 1.26% 757 1.47% 933 0.86%
3/1/2002 792 0.89% 746 0.95% 925 0.33%
2/1/2002 785 0.26% 739 0.27% 922 0.00%
1/1/2002 783 0.77% 737 0.82% 922 0.33%
12/1/2001 777 0.39% 731 0.27% 919 0.55%
11/1/2001 774 0.52% 729 0.55% 914 0.33%
10/1/2001 770 1.45% 725 1.68% 911 0.00%
9/1/2001 759 0.26% 713 0.42% 911 0.00%
8/1/2001 757 0.66% 710 0.71% 911 0.33%
7/1/2001 752 1.48% 705 1.73% 908 0.00%
6/1/2001 741 1.51% 693 1.61% 908 0.00%
5/1/2001 730 0.83% 682 0.89% 908 0.00%
4/1/2001 724 0.70% 676 0.75% 908 0.00%
3/1/2001 719 0.70% 671 0.75% 908 0.00%
2/1/2001 714 0.14% 666 0.15% 908 0.11%
1/1/2001 713 0.14% 665 0.15% 907 0.00%
12/1/2000 712 0.14% 664 0.15% 907 0.00%
11/1/2000 711 0.14% 663 0.15% 907 0.11%
10/1/2000 710 0.28% 662 0.30% 906 0.00%
9/1/2000 708 0.00% 660 0.00% 906 0.00%
8/1/2000 708 0.43% 660 0.46% 906 0.00%
7/1/2000 705 0.57% 657 0.61% 906 0.11%
6/1/2000 701 0.14% 653 0.15% 905 0.00%
5/1/2000 700 0.57% 652 0.77% 905 0.00%
4/1/2000 696 0.14% 647 0.15% 905 -0.22%
3/1/2000 695 0.43% 646 0.62% 907 -0.55%
2/1/2000 692 0.00% 642 0.00% 912 -0.11%
1/1/2000 692 0.14% 642 0.16% 913 -0.11%
12/1/1999 691 -0.14% 641 0.00% 914 -0.44%
11/1/1999 692 0.14% 641 0.16% 918 -0.43%
10/1/1999 691 -0.58% 640 -0.31% 922 -1.39%
9/1/1999 695 -0.14% 642 -0.16% 935 -0.32%
8/1/1999 696 -0.14% 643 -0.16% 938 -0.64%
7/1/1999 697 -0.43% 644 -0.16% 944 -1.97%
6/1/1999 700 -0.43% 645 -0.15% 963 -1.53%
5/1/1999 703 -0.42% 646 -0.31% 978 -1.31%
4/1/1999 706 -0.56% 648 -0.61% 991 -0.70%
3/1/1999 710 -0.42% 652 -0.15% 998 -0.89%
2/1/1999 713 -0.28% 653 -0.31% 1007 -0.98%
1/1/1999 715 -1.24% 655 -1.21% 1017 -1.17%
12/1/1998 724 -0.82% 663 -0.90% 1029 -0.87%
11/1/1998 730 -0.95% 669 -0.74% 1038 -2.08%
10/1/1998 737 -0.94% 674 -0.88% 1060 -1.12%
9/1/1998 744 -0.67% 680 -0.44% 1072 -1.56%
8/1/1998 749 -0.93% 683 -1.01% 1089 -1.00%
7/1/1998 756 -1.18% 690 -1.00% 1100 -1.96%
6/1/1998 765 -0.91% 697 -0.99% 1122 -1.06%
5/1/1998 772 -1.78% 704 -1.81% 1134 -1.13%
4/1/1998 786 -1.38% 717 -1.24% 1147 -1.97%
3/1/1998 797 -1.48% 726 -1.76% 1170 -0.34%
2/1/1998 809 -1.10% 739 -1.07% 1174 -0.59%
1/1/1998 818 -0.24% 747 -0.27% 1181 -0.25%
12/1/1997 820 -0.61% 749 -0.66% 1184 -0.08%
11/1/1997 825 -0.96% 754 -0.92% 1185 -1.33%
10/1/1997 833 -0.48% 761 -0.52% 1201 -0.25%
9/1/1997 837 -0.59% 765 -0.52% 1204 -0.41%
8/1/1997 842 -1.06% 769 -0.77% 1209 -3.20%
7/1/1997 851 -1.96% 775 -2.02% 1249 -1.34%
6/1/1997 868 -0.91% 791 -1.13% 1266 -0.31%
5/1/1997 876 -1.02% 800 -0.87% 1270 -1.47%
4/1/1997 885 -0.23% 807 0.00% 1289 -1.23%
3/1/1997 887 -0.11% 807 -0.12% 1305 -0.23%
2/1/1997 888 -0.11% 808 0.00% 1308 -0.23%
1/1/1997 889 -0.45% 808 -0.08% 1311 -1.58%
12/1/1996 893 0.00% 809 -0.08% 1332 0.00%
11/1/1996 893 0.00% 810 -0.08% 1332 0.00%
10/1/1996 893 0.11% 810 0.12% 1332 -0.97%
9/1/1996 892 0.00% 809 0.12% 1345 0.00%
8/1/1996 892 0.00% 808 0.12% 1345 0.00%
7/1/1996 892 -0.89% 807 -0.03% 1345 -2.54%
6/1/1996 900 0.00% 808 -0.03% 1380 0.00%
5/1/1996 900 0.00% 808 -0.03% 1380 0.00%
4/1/1996 900 -1.21% 808 -0.37% 1380 -1.50%
3/1/1996 911 0.00% 811 -0.37% 1401 0.00%
2/1/1996 911 0.00% 814 -0.37% 1401 0.00%
1/1/1996 911 -1.19% 817 -0.48% 1401 -0.50%
12/1/1995 922 0.00% 821 -0.48% 1408 0.00%
11/1/1995 922 0.00% 825 -0.48% 1408 0.00%
10/1/1995 922 -1.60% 829 -0.28% 1408 -3.16%
9/1/1995 937 0.00% 831 -0.28% 1454 0.00%
8/1/1995 937 0.00% 834 -0.28% 1454 0.00%
7/1/1995 937 -0.43% 836 0.16% 1454 -0.48%
6/1/1995 941 0.00% 835 0.16% 1461 0.00%
5/1/1995 941 0.00% 833 0.16% 1461 0.00%
4/1/1995 941 -0.11% 832 -0.12% 1461 -0.14%
3/1/1995 942 0.00% 833 -0.12% 1463 0.00%
2/1/1995 942 0.00% 834 -0.12% 1463 0.00%
1/1/1995 942 835 1463
���� Composite Index ���� Residential Index ����� Office Index
������  (valuer.org.cn)
�� Date �� Index �� (+ / -) �� Index �� (+ / -) �� Index �� (+ / -)
5/1/2004 1251 1.38% 1201 1.44% 1220 0.74%
4/1/2004 1234 1.82% 1184 1.89% 1211 1.25%
3/1/2004 1212 1.42% 1162 1.48% 1196 1.10%
2/1/2004 1195 1.44% 1145 1.51% 1183 1.20%
1/1/2004 1178 0.51% 1128 0.45% 1169 0.95%
12/1/2003 1172 1.82% 1123 1.91% 1158 1.05%
11/1/2003 1151 3.88% 1102 -4.84% 1146 1.42%
10/1/2003 1108 1.93% 1158 11.56% 1130 1.53%
9/1/2003 1087 2.26% 1038 2.47% 1113 0.72%
8/1/2003 1063 1.72% 1013 1.71% 1105 1.19%
7/1/2003 1045 4.29% 996 4.51% 1092 1.49%
6/1/2003 1002 2.24% 953 2.47% 1076 0.65%
5/1/2003 980 1.98% 930 2.09% 1069 1.04%
4/1/2003 961 1.69% 911 1.79% 1058 0.86%
3/1/2003 945 2.16% 895 1.82% 1049 3.25%
2/1/2003 925 2.55% 879 2.81% 1016 0.69%
1/1/2003 902 1.23% 855 1.30% 1009 0.90%
12/1/2002 891 1.60% 844 1.69% 1000 1.01%
11/1/2002 877 1.15% 830 1.22% 990 0.61%
10/1/2002 867 1.52% 820 1.61% 984 0.72%
9/1/2002 854 1.55% 807 1.64% 977 0.62%
8/1/2002 841 1.45% 794 1.53% 971 1.15%
7/1/2002 829 0.73% 782 0.51% 960 0.73%
6/1/2002 823 1.35% 778 1.43% 953 1.06%
5/1/2002 812 1.25% 767 1.32% 943 1.07%
4/1/2002 802 1.26% 757 1.47% 933 0.86%
3/1/2002 792 0.89% 746 0.95% 925 0.33%
2/1/2002 785 0.26% 739 0.27% 922 0.00%
1/1/2002 783 0.77% 737 0.82% 922 0.33%
12/1/2001 777 0.39% 731 0.27% 919 0.55%
11/1/2001 774 0.52% 729 0.55% 914 0.33%
10/1/2001 770 1.45% 725 1.68% 911 0.00%
9/1/2001 759 0.26% 713 0.42% 911 0.00%
8/1/2001 757 0.66% 710 0.71% 911 0.33%
7/1/2001 752 1.48% 705 1.73% 908 0.00%
6/1/2001 741 1.51% 693 1.61% 908 0.00%
5/1/2001 730 0.83% 682 0.89% 908 0.00%
4/1/2001 724 0.70% 676 0.75% 908 0.00%
3/1/2001 719 0.70% 671 0.75% 908 0.00%
2/1/2001 714 0.14% 666 0.15% 908 0.11%
1/1/2001 713 0.14% 665 0.15% 907 0.00%
12/1/2000 712 0.14% 664 0.15% 907 0.00%
11/1/2000 711 0.14% 663 0.15% 907 0.11%
10/1/2000 710 0.28% 662 0.30% 906 0.00%
9/1/2000 708 0.00% 660 0.00% 906 0.00%
8/1/2000 708 0.43% 660 0.46% 906 0.00%
7/1/2000 705 0.57% 657 0.61% 906 0.11%
6/1/2000 701 0.14% 653 0.15% 905 0.00%
5/1/2000 700 0.57% 652 0.77% 905 0.00%
4/1/2000 696 0.14% 647 0.15% 905 -0.22%
3/1/2000 695 0.43% 646 0.62% 907 -0.55%
2/1/2000 692 0.00% 642 0.00% 912 -0.11%
1/1/2000 692 0.14% 642 0.16% 913 -0.11%
12/1/1999 691 -0.14% 641 0.00% 914 -0.44%
11/1/1999 692 0.14% 641 0.16% 918 -0.43%
10/1/1999 691 -0.58% 640 -0.31% 922 -1.39%
9/1/1999 695 -0.14% 642 -0.16% 935 -0.32%
8/1/1999 696 -0.14% 643 -0.16% 938 -0.64%
7/1/1999 697 -0.43% 644 -0.16% 944 -1.97%
6/1/1999 700 -0.43% 645 -0.15% 963 -1.53%
5/1/1999 703 -0.42% 646 -0.31% 978 -1.31%
4/1/1999 706 -0.56% 648 -0.61% 991 -0.70%
3/1/1999 710 -0.42% 652 -0.15% 998 -0.89%
2/1/1999 713 -0.28% 653 -0.31% 1007 -0.98%
1/1/1999 715 -1.24% 655 -1.21% 1017 -1.17%
12/1/1998 724 -0.82% 663 -0.90% 1029 -0.87%
11/1/1998 730 -0.95% 669 -0.74% 1038 -2.08%
10/1/1998 737 -0.94% 674 -0.88% 1060 -1.12%
9/1/1998 744 -0.67% 680 -0.44% 1072 -1.56%
8/1/1998 749 -0.93% 683 -1.01% 1089 -1.00%
7/1/1998 756 -1.18% 690 -1.00% 1100 -1.96%
6/1/1998 765 -0.91% 697 -0.99% 1122 -1.06%
5/1/1998 772 -1.78% 704 -1.81% 1134 -1.13%
4/1/1998 786 -1.38% 717 -1.24% 1147 -1.97%
3/1/1998 797 -1.48% 726 -1.76% 1170 -0.34%
2/1/1998 809 -1.10% 739 -1.07% 1174 -0.59%
1/1/1998 818 -0.24% 747 -0.27% 1181 -0.25%
12/1/1997 820 -0.61% 749 -0.66% 1184 -0.08%
11/1/1997 825 -0.96% 754 -0.92% 1185 -1.33%
10/1/1997 833 -0.48% 761 -0.52% 1201 -0.25%
9/1/1997 837 -0.59% 765 -0.52% 1204 -0.41%
8/1/1997 842 -1.06% 769 -0.77% 1209 -3.20%
7/1/1997 851 -1.96% 775 -2.02% 1249 -1.34%
6/1/1997 868 -0.91% 791 -1.13% 1266 -0.31%
5/1/1997 876 -1.02% 800 -0.87% 1270 -1.47%
4/1/1997 885 -0.23% 807 0.00% 1289 -1.23%
3/1/1997 887 -0.11% 807 -0.12% 1305 -0.23%
2/1/1997 888 -0.11% 808 0.00% 1308 -0.23%
1/1/1997 889 -0.45% 808 -0.08% 1311 -1.58%
12/1/1996 893 0.00% 809 -0.08% 1332 0.00%
11/1/1996 893 0.00% 810 -0.08% 1332 0.00%
10/1/1996 893 0.11% 810 0.12% 1332 -0.97%
9/1/1996 892 0.00% 809 0.12% 1345 0.00%
8/1/1996 892 0.00% 808 0.12% 1345 0.00%
7/1/1996 892 -0.89% 807 -0.03% 1345 -2.54%
6/1/1996 900 0.00% 808 -0.03% 1380 0.00%
5/1/1996 900 0.00% 808 -0.03% 1380 0.00%
4/1/1996 900 -1.21% 808 -0.37% 1380 -1.50%
3/1/1996 911 0.00% 811 -0.37% 1401 0.00%
2/1/1996 911 0.00% 814 -0.37% 1401 0.00%
1/1/1996 911 -1.19% 817 -0.48% 1401 -0.50%
12/1/1995 922 0.00% 821 -0.48% 1408 0.00%
11/1/1995 922 0.00% 825 -0.48% 1408 0.00%
10/1/1995 922 -1.60% 829 -0.28% 1408 -3.16%
9/1/1995 937 0.00% 831 -0.28% 1454 0.00%
8/1/1995 937 0.00% 834 -0.28% 1454 0.00%
7/1/1995 937 -0.43% 836 0.16% 1454 -0.48%
6/1/1995 941 0.00% 835 0.16% 1461 0.00%
5/1/1995 941 0.00% 833 0.16% 1461 0.00%
4/1/1995 941 -0.11% 832 -0.12% 1461 -0.14%
3/1/1995 942 0.00% 833 -0.12% 1463 0.00%
2/1/1995 942 0.00% 834 -0.12% 1463 0.00%
1/1/1995 942 835 1463
���� Composite Index ���� Residential Index ����� Office Index
������  (valuer.org.cn)
�� Date �� Index �� (+ / -) �� Index �� (+ / -) �� Index �� (+ / -)
2004 1251 1.38 1201 1.44 2 0.74
2004 1234 1.82 1184 1 89 11 1.25
2004 1212 1.42 1162 1.48 196 1.10
2004 1195 1.44 1145 1 51 183 1.20
2004 1178 0.51 1128 0.45 169 0.95
2003 1172 1 82 1123 1.91 158 1 5
2003 1151 3 88 1102 4 84 146 1 42
2003 1108 1 93 1158 11.56 1 0 1.53
2003 1087 2 26 1038 2 47 113 72
2003 1063 1 72 1013 1 71 10 1 19
2003 1045 4.29 996 4.51 092 1.49
2003 1002 2 24 953 2.47 076 65
2003 8 1 98 930 2.09 069 1 4
2003 61 1.69 911 1.79 058 0.86
2003 45 2 16 95 1.82 049 3 25
2003 25 2 55 79 2.81 016 69
2003 02 1.23 55 1.30 0 9 0.90
2002 891 1 6 44 1.69 0 0 1 1
2002 877 1 15 30 1.22 990 61
2002 867 1.52 0 1.61 984 0.72
2002 854 1 55 07 1.64 977 62
2002 841 1 45 79 1.53 971 1 15
2002 829 0.73 782 51 960 0.73
2002 823 1 35 778 1 43 953 1 6
2002 812 1 25 767 1 32 943 1 7
2002 802 1.26 757 1.47 933 0.86
2002 79 89 746 0.95 925 33
2002 785 26 7 9 0.27 922
2002 783 0.77% 7 7 0.82% 922 0.33%
12/1/2001 777 0.39% 731 0.27% 919 0.55%
11/1/2001 774 0.52% 729 0.55% 914 0.33%
10/1/2001 770 1.45% 725 1.68% 911 0.00%
9/1/2001 759 0.26% 713 0.42% 911 0.00%
8/1/2001 757 0.66% 710 0.71% 911 0.33%
7/1/2001 752 1.48% 705 1.73% 908 0.00%
6/1/2001 741 1.51% 693 1.61% 908 0.00%
5/1/2001 730 0.83% 682 0.89% 908 0.00%
4/1/2001 724 0.70% 676 0.75% 908 0.00%
3/1/2001 719 0.70% 671 0.75% 908 0.00%
2/1/2001 714 0.14% 666 0.15% 908 0.11%
1/1/2001 713 0.14% 665 0.15% 907 0.00%
12/1/2000 712 0.14% 664 0.15% 907 0.00%
11/1/2000 711 0.14% 663 0.15% 907 0.11%
10/1/2000 710 0.28% 662 0.30% 906 0.00%
9/1/2000 708 0.00% 660 0.00% 906 0.00%
8/1/2000 708 0.43% 660 0.46% 906 0.00%
7/1/2000 705 0.57% 657 0.61% 906 0.11%
6/1/2000 701 0.14% 653 0.15% 905 0.00%
5/1/2000 700 0.57% 652 0.77% 905 0.00%
4/1/2000 696 0.14% 647 0.15% 905 -0.22%
3/1/2000 695 0.43% 646 0.62% 907 -0.55%
2/1/2000 692 0.00% 642 0.00% 912 -0.11%
1/1/2000 692 0.14% 642 0.16% 913 -0.11%
12/1/1999 691 -0.14% 641 0.00% 914 -0.44%
11/1/1999 692 0.14% 641 0.16% 918 -0.43%
10/1/1999 691 -0.58% 640 -0.31% 922 -1.39%
9/1/1999 695 -0.14% 642 -0.16% 935 -0.32%
8/1/1999 696 -0.14% 643 -0.16% 938 -0.64%
7/1/1999 697 -0.43% 644 -0.16% 944 -1.97%
6/1/1999 700 -0.43% 645 -0.15% 963 -1.53%
5/1/1999 703 -0.42% 646 -0.31% 978 -1.31%
4/1/1999 706 -0.56% 648 -0.61% 991 -0.70%
3/1/1999 710 -0.42% 652 -0.15% 998 -0.89%
2/1/1999 713 -0.28% 653 -0.31% 1007 -0.98%
1/1/1999 715 -1.24% 655 -1.21% 1017 -1.17%
12/1/1998 724 -0.82% 663 -0.90% 1029 -0.87%
11/1/1998 730 -0.95% 669 -0.74% 1038 -2.08%
10/1/1998 737 -0.94% 674 -0.88% 1060 -1.12%
9/1/1998 744 -0.67% 680 -0.44% 1072 -1.56%
8/1/1998 749 -0.93% 683 -1.01% 1089 -1.00%
7/1/1998 756 -1.18% 690 -1.00% 1100 -1.96%
6/1/1998 765 -0.91% 697 -0.99% 1122 -1.06%
5/1/1998 772 -1.78% 704 -1.81% 1134 -1.13%
4/1/1998 786 -1.38% 717 -1.24% 1147 -1.97%
3/1/1998 797 -1.48% 726 -1.76% 1170 -0.34%
2/1/1998 809 -1.10% 739 -1.07% 1174 -0.59%
1/1/1998 818 -0.24% 747 -0.27% 1181 -0.25%
12/1/1997 820 -0.61% 749 -0.66% 1184 -0.08%
11/1/1997 825 -0.96% 754 -0.92% 1185 -1.33%
10/1/1997 833 -0.48% 761 -0.52% 1201 -0.25%
9/1/1997 837 -0.59% 765 -0.52% 1204 -0.41%
8/1/1997 842 -1.06% 769 -0.77% 1209 -3.20%
7/1/1997 851 -1.96% 775 -2.02% 1249 -1.34%
6/1/1997 868 -0.91% 791 -1.13% 1266 -0.31%
5/1/1997 876 -1.02% 800 -0.87% 1270 -1.47%
4/1/1997 885 -0.23% 807 0.00% 1289 -1.23%
3/1/1997 887 -0.11% 807 -0.12% 1305 -0.23%
2/1/1997 888 -0.11% 808 0.00% 1308 -0.23%
1/1/1997 889 -0.45% 808 -0.08% 1311 -1.58%
12/1/1996 893 0.00% 809 -0.08% 1332 0.00%
11/1/1996 893 0.00% 810 -0.08% 1332 0.00%
10/1/1996 893 0.11% 810 0.12% 1332 -0.97%
9/1/1996 892 0.00% 809 0.12% 1345 0.00%
8/1/1996 892 0.00% 808 0.12% 1345 0.00%
7/1/1996 892 -0.89% 807 -0.03% 1345 -2.54%
6/1/1996 900 0.00% 808 -0.03% 1380 0.00%
5/1/1996 900 0.00% 808 -0.03% 1380 0.00%
4/1/1996 900 -1.21% 808 -0.37% 1380 -1.50%
3/1/1996 911 0.00% 811 -0.37% 1401 0.00%
2/1/1996 911 0.00% 814 -0.37% 1401 0.00%
1/1/1996 911 -1.19% 817 -0.48% 1401 -0.50%
12/1/1995 922 0.00% 821 -0.48% 1408 0.00%
11/1/1995 922 0.00% 825 -0.48% 1408 0.00%
10/1/1995 922 -1.60% 829 -0.28% 1408 -3.16%
9/1/1995 937 0.00% 831 -0.28% 1454 0.00%
8/1/1995 937 0.00% 834 -0.28% 1454 0.00%
7/1/1995 937 -0.43% 836 0.16% 1454 -0.48%
6/1/1995 941 0.00% 835 0.16% 1461 0.00%
5/1/1995 941 0.00% 833 0.16% 1461 0.00%
4/1/1995 941 -0.11% 832 -0.12% 1461 -0.14%
3/1/1995 942 0.00% 833 -0.12% 1463 0.00%
2/1/1995 942 0.00% 834 -0.12% 1463 0.00%
1/1/1995 942 835 1463
���� Composite Index ���� Residential Index ����� Office Index
������  (valuer.org.cn)
Appendix
Appendix B CREIS Shanghai Property Index
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Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
23569.77
22095.18
20712.85 20712.85
19417.00 19417.00
18202.22 18202.22 18202.22
17063.45 17063.45 17063.45
15995.91 15995.91 15995.91 15995.91
14995.17 14995.17 14995.17 14995.17
14057.03 14057.03 14057.03 14057.03 14057.03
13177.59 13177.59 13177.59 13177.59 13177.59
12353.16 12353.16 12353.16 12353.16 12353.16 12353.16
11580.32 11580.32 11580.32 11580.32 11580.32 11580.32
10855.82 10855.82 10855.82 10855.82 10855.82 10855.82 10855.82
10176.65 10176.65 10176.65 10176.65 10176.65 10176.65 10176.65
9539.97 9539.97 9539.97 9539.97 9539.97 9539.97 9539.97 9539.97
8943.13 8943.13 8943.13 8943.13 8943.13 8943.13 8943.13 8943.13
8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62
7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12
7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44
6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51
6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42
6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36
5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65
5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69
5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00
4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19
4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94
4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05
3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35
3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77
3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31
3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02
2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00
2795.44 2795.44 2795.44 2795.44 2795.44 2795.44 2795.44 2795.44
2620.55 2620.55 2620.55 2620.55 2620.55 2620.55 2620.55 2620.55
2456.60 2456.60 2456.60 2456.60 2456.60 2456.60 2456.60
2302.91 2302.91 2302.91 2302.91 2302.91 2302.91 2302.91
2158.84 2158.84 2158.84 2158.84 2158.84 2158.84
2023.77 2023.77 2023.77 2023.77 2023.77 2023.77
1897.16 1897.16 1897.16 1897.16 1897.16
1778.47 1778.47 1778.47 1778.47 1778.47
1667.20 1667.20 1667.20 1667.20
1562.90 1562.90 1562.90 1562.90
1465.12 1465.12 1465.12
1373.46 1373.46 1373.46
1287.53 1287.53
1206.98 1206.98
1131.47
1060.68
ASSUMPTIONS CALCULATIONS NOTES
Asset Value (Vt) �5,000.00 Stepping-Time (dt) 1.0000 10-yr Treasury Bond 3.00% 0.25%
Strike Price #2 (Construction) �2,500.00 Up Step-Size (up) 1.0667 3-yr Treasury Bond 2.75% 0.23%
Risk-free Rate (Rf) 0.19% Down Step-Size (down) 0.9374 2-yr CD 2.25% 0.19%
Divident Yield (y) 0.60% Risk-neutral Probability (prob) 45.20% 1-yr Treasury Bond 2.00% 0.17%
Volatility (�) 6.46%
Maturity (t) 24 Monthly Volatility 1.12%
Lattice Steps 24 Strike Price #1 (Resettlement) �1,282.74 Quarterly Volatility 3.24% 1.87% (Implied monthly volatility)
Semi Annual Volatility 6.66% 2.72% (Implied monthly volatility)
Annual Volatility 13.62% 3.93% (Implied monthly volatility)
Biennial Volatility 31.65% 6.46% (Implied monthly volatility)
Treshhold Volatility 7.87%
Res. Bldg. Efficiency 100.00%
Construction Cost �2,500.00 (RMB / m2)
Apartment Rental Rate �30.00 (RMB / m2 / Month)
A
ppendix
Appendix C Underlying Asset Lattice (Vt)
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Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
21069.77
19595.18
18212.85 18212.85
16917.00 16917.00
15702.22 15702.22 15702.22
14563.45 14563.45 14563.45
13495.91 13495.91 13495.91 13495.91
12495.17 12495.17 12495.17 12495.17
11557.03 11557.03 11557.03 11557.03 11557.03
10677.59 10677.59 10677.59 10677.59 10677.59
9853.16 9853.16 9853.16 9853.16 9853.16 9853.16
9080.32 9080.32 9080.32 9080.32 9080.32 9080.32
8355.82 8355.82 8355.82 8355.82 8355.82 8355.82 8355.82
7676.65 7676.65 7676.65 7676.65 7676.65 7676.65 7676.65
7039.97 7039.97 7039.97 7039.97 7039.97 7039.97 7039.97 7039.97
6443.13 6443.13 6443.13 6443.13 6443.13 6443.13 6443.13 6443.13
5883.62 5883.62 5883.62 5883.62 5883.62 5883.62 5883.62 5883.62 5883.62
5359.12 5359.12 5359.12 5359.12 5359.12 5359.12 5359.12 5359.12 5359.12
4867.44 4867.44 4867.44 4867.44 4867.44 4867.44 4867.44 4867.44 4867.44 4867.44
4406.51 4406.51 4406.51 4406.51 4406.51 4406.51 4406.51 4406.51 4406.51 4406.51
3974.42 3974.42 3974.42 3974.42 3974.42 3974.42 3974.42 3974.42 3974.42 3974.42 3974.42
3569.36 3569.36 3569.36 3569.36 3569.36 3569.36 3569.36 3569.36 3569.36 3569.36 3569.36
3189.65 3189.65 3189.65 3189.65 3189.65 3189.65 3189.65 3189.65 3189.65 3189.65 3189.65 3189.65
2833.69 2833.69 2833.69 2833.69 2833.69 2833.69 2833.69 2833.69 2833.69 2833.69 2833.69 2833.69
2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00
2187.19 2187.19 2187.19 2187.19 2187.19 2187.19 2187.19 2187.19 2187.19 2187.19 2187.19 2187.19
1893.94 1893.94 1893.94 1893.94 1893.94 1893.94 1893.94 1893.94 1893.94 1893.94 1893.94 1893.94
1619.05 1619.05 1619.05 1619.05 1619.05 1619.05 1619.05 1619.05 1619.05 1619.05 1619.05
1361.35 1361.35 1361.35 1361.35 1361.35 1361.35 1361.35 1361.35 1361.35 1361.35 1361.35
1119.77 1119.77 1119.77 1119.77 1119.77 1119.77 1119.77 1119.77 1119.77 1119.77
893.31 893.31 893.31 893.31 893.31 893.31 893.31 893.31 893.31 893.31
681.02 681.02 681.02 681.02 681.02 681.02 681.02 681.02 681.02
505.30 501.50 497.21 492.37 487.07 482.00 482.00 482.00 482.00
362.07 355.14 347.28 338.43 328.74 319.17 306.65 295.44
248.29 239.15 228.79 216.98 203.44 185.93 163.05 120.55
161.00 150.78 139.12 125.54 108.67 86.99 54.39
97.08 86.94 75.36 61.70 45.30 24.54 0.00
53.12 44.19 34.23 23.17 11.07 0.00
25.40 18.63 11.69 5.00 0.00 0.00
9.98 5.83 2.25 0.00 0.00
2.88 1.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00
ASSUMPTIONS CALCULATIONS NOTES
Asset Value (Vt) �5,000.00 Stepping-Time (dt) 1.0000 10-yr Treasury Bond 3.00% 0.25%
Strike Price #2 (Construction) �2,500.00 Up Step-Size (up) 1.0667 3-yr Treasury Bond 2.75% 0.23%
Risk-free Rate (Rf) 0.19% Down Step-Size (down) 0.9374 2-yr CD 2.25% 0.19%
Divident Yield (y) 0.60% Risk-neutral Probability (prob) 45.20% 1-yr Treasury Bond 2.00% 0.17%
Volatility (�) 6.46%
Maturity (t) 24 Monthly Volatility 1.12%
Lattice Steps 24 Strike Price #1 (Resettlement) �1,282.74 Quarterly Volatility 3.24% 1.87% (Implied monthly volatility)
Semi Annual Volatility 6.66% 2.72% (Implied monthly volatility)
Annual Volatility 13.62% 3.93% (Implied monthly volatility)
Biennial Volatility 31.65% 6.46% (Implied monthly volatility)
Treshhold Volatility 7.87%
Res. Bldg. Efficiency 100.00%
Construction Cost �2,500.00 (RMB / m2)
Apartment Rental Rate �30.00 (RMB / m2 / Month)
A
ppendix
Appendix D Option 2 Lattice (Construction)
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Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Execute
Execute
Execute Execute
Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute Execute Execute Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue End
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue End
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue End
Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue End
Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue End
Continue Continue
Continue End
Continue
End
ASSUMPTIONS CALCULATIONS NOTES
Asset Value (Vt) �5,000.00 Stepping-Time (dt) 1.0000 10-yr Treasury Bond 3.00% 0.25%
Strike Price #2 (Construction) �2,500.00 Up Step-Size (up) 1.0667 3-yr Treasury Bond 2.75% 0.23%
Risk-free Rate (Rf) 0.19% Down Step-Size (down) 0.9374 2-yr CD 2.25% 0.19%
Divident Yield (y) 0.60% Risk-neutral Probability (prob) 45.20% 1-yr Treasury Bond 2.00% 0.17%
Volatility (�) 6.46%
Maturity (t) 24 Monthly Volatility 1.12%
Lattice Steps 24 Strike Price #1 (Resettlement) �1,282.74 Quarterly Volatility 3.24% 1.87% (Implied monthly volatility)
Semi Annual Volatility 6.66% 2.72% (Implied monthly volatility)
Annual Volatility 13.62% 3.93% (Implied monthly volatility)
Biennial Volatility 31.65% 6.46% (Implied monthly volatility)
Treshhold Volatility 7.87%
Res. Bldg. Efficiency 100.00%
Construction Cost �2,500.00 (RMB / m2)
Apartment Rental Rate �30.00 (RMB / m2 / Month)
A
ppendix
Appendix E Decision 2 Lattice (Construction)
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Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
7073.08
6393.91
5757.23 5757.23
5160.39 5160.39
4600.88 4600.88 4600.88
4076.38 4076.38 4076.38
3584.69 3584.69 3584.69 3584.69
3123.77 3123.77 3123.77 3123.77
2691.68 2691.68 2691.68 2691.68 2691.68
2286.62 2286.62 2286.62 2286.62 2286.62
1906.90 1906.90 1906.90 1906.90 1906.90 1906.90
1550.95 1550.95 1550.95 1550.95 1550.95 1550.95
1217.26 1217.26 1217.26 1217.26 1217.26 1217.26 1217.26
904.44 904.44 904.44 904.44 904.44 904.44
644.23 634.35 622.82 611.20 611.20 611.20
431.79 413.73 392.63 369.36 336.30
266.16 242.66 213.67 171.13 78.61
145.34 119.78 85.96 35.47
65.56 42.73 16.00 0.00
21.06 7.22 0.00
3.26 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00
Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Execute
Execute
Execute Execute
Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute Execute
Continue Continue Continue Execute Execute Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue End
Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue End
Continue Continue
Continue End
Continue
End
A
ppendix
Appendix F Option 1 Lattice (Resettlement)
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Appendix G Decision 1 Lattice (Resettlement)
Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
23569.77
22095.18
20712.85 20712.85
19417.00 19417.00
18202.22 18202.22 18202.22
17063.45 17063.45 17063.45
15995.91 15995.91 15995.91 15995.91
14995.17 14995.17 14995.17 14995.17
14057.03 14057.03 14057.03 14057.03 14057.03
13177.59 13177.59 13177.59 13177.59 13177.59
12353.16 12353.16 12353.16 12353.16 12353.16 12353.16
11580.32 11580.32 11580.32 11580.32 11580.32 11580.32
10855.82 10855.82 10855.82 10855.82 10855.82 10855.82 10855.82
10176.65 10176.65 10176.65 10176.65 10176.65 10176.65 10176.65
9539.97 9539.97 9539.97 9539.97 9539.97 9539.97 9539.97 9539.97
8943.13 8943.13 8943.13 8943.13 8943.13 8943.13 8943.13 8943.13
8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62 8383.62
7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12 7859.12
7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44 7367.44
6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51 6906.51
6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42 6474.42
6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36 6069.36
5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65 5689.65
5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69 5333.69
5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00 5000.00
4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19 4687.19
4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94 4393.94
4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05 4119.05
3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35 3861.35
3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77 3619.77
3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31 3393.31
3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02 3181.02
2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00 2982.00
2795.44 2795.44 2795.44 2795.44 2795.44 2795.44 2795.44 2795.44
2620.55 2620.55 2620.55 2620.55 2620.55 2620.55 2620.55 2620.55
2456.60 2456.60 2456.60 2456.60 2456.60 2456.60 2456.60
2302.91 2302.91 2302.91 2302.91 2302.91 2302.91 2302.91
2158.84 2158.84 2158.84 2158.84 2158.84 2158.84
2023.77 2023.77 2023.77 2023.77 2023.77 2023.77
1897.16 1897.16 1897.16 1897.16 1897.16
1778.47 1778.47 1778.47 1778.47 1778.47
1667.20 1667.20 1667.20 1667.20
1562.90 1562.90 1562.90 1562.90
1465.12 1465.12 1465.12
1373.46 1373.46 1373.46
1287.53 1287.53
1206.98 1206.98
1131.47
1060.68
ASSUMPTIONS CALCULATIONS NOTES
Asset Value (Vt) �5,000.00 Stepping-Time (dt) 1.0000 10-yr Treasury Bond 3.00% 0.25%
Strike Price #2 (Construction) �2,500.00 Up Step-Size (up) 1.0667 3-yr Treasury Bond 2.75% 0.23%
Risk-free Rate (Rf) 0.19% Down Step-Size (down) 0.9374 2-yr CD 2.25% 0.19%
Divident Yield (y) 0.00% Risk-neutral Probability (prob) 49.84% 1-yr Treasury Bond 2.00% 0.17%
Volatility (�) 6.46%
Maturity (t) 24 Monthly Volatility 1.12%
Lattice Steps 24 Strike Price #1 (Resettlement) �1,282.74 Quarterly Volatility 3.24% 1.87% (Implied monthly volatility)
Semi Annual Volatility 6.66% 2.72% (Implied monthly volatility)
Annual Volatility 13.62% 3.93% (Implied monthly volatility)
Biennial Volatility 31.65% 6.46% (Implied monthly volatility)
Treshhold Volatility 7.87%
Res. Bldg. Efficiency 100.00%
Construction Cost �2,500.00 (RMB / m2)
Apartment Rental Rate �30.00 (RMB / m2 / Month)
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Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
21069.77
19599.91
18222.28 18212.85
16931.13 16921.72
15721.03 15711.64 15702.22
14586.92 14577.56 14568.16
13524.05 13514.70 13505.33 13495.91
12527.95 12518.63 12509.27 12499.88
11594.45 11585.15 11575.81 11566.44 11557.03
10719.63 10710.35 10701.03 10691.68 10682.29
9899.82 9890.56 9881.26 9871.93 9862.56 9853.16
9131.57 9122.33 9113.06 9103.75 9094.40 9085.02
8411.67 8402.45 8393.19 8383.90 8374.58 8365.22 8355.82
7737.09 7727.88 7718.65 7709.38 7700.07 7690.73 7681.35
7104.98 7095.80 7086.58 7077.33 7068.04 7058.72 7049.37 7039.97
6512.70 6503.53 6494.34 6485.10 6475.84 6466.54 6457.20 6447.83
5957.75 5948.60 5939.42 5930.21 5920.96 5911.68 5902.36 5893.01 5883.62
5437.79 5428.66 5419.50 5410.31 5401.08 5391.82 5382.52 5373.19 5363.82
4950.64 4941.53 4932.39 4923.21 4914.00 4904.76 4895.48 4886.17 4876.82 4867.44
4494.24 4485.15 4476.02 4466.87 4457.68 4448.45 4439.19 4429.90 4420.57 4411.20
4066.71 4057.61 4048.49 4039.35 4030.18 4020.97 4011.73 4002.46 3993.15 3983.80 3974.42
3666.30 3657.15 3648.01 3638.86 3629.70 3620.52 3611.29 3602.04 3592.75 3583.42 3574.06
3291.46 3282.18 3272.95 3263.75 3254.57 3245.39 3236.19 3226.95 3217.68 3208.37 3199.03 3189.65
2940.91 2931.36 2921.91 2912.55 2903.27 2894.04 2884.83 2875.61 2866.35 2857.06 2847.74 2838.38
2613.59 2603.62 2593.78 2584.08 2574.52 2565.09 2555.78 2546.53 2537.29 2528.02 2518.72 2509.38 2500.00
2298.16 2287.72 2277.46 2267.39 2257.52 2247.87 2238.41 2229.09 2219.84 2210.56 2201.23 2191.88
2003.28 1992.20 1981.33 1970.72 1960.38 1950.36 1940.66 1931.23 1921.96 1912.66 1903.32 1893.94
1728.17 1716.24 1704.54 1693.13 1682.08 1671.47 1661.34 1651.70 1642.41 1633.09 1623.74
1472.30 1459.27 1446.46 1433.94 1421.83 1410.27 1399.40 1389.36 1380.06 1370.72 1361.35
1235.45 1221.05 1206.78 1192.76 1179.12 1166.09 1153.97 1143.13 1133.82 1124.46
1017.69 1001.67 985.61 969.62 953.87 938.65 924.42 912.01 902.68 893.31
819.44 801.62 783.49 765.11 746.59 728.22 710.57 695.06 685.71
641.45 621.82 601.49 580.42 558.57 536.01 513.09 491.37 482.00
484.72 463.52 441.19 417.49 392.11 364.58 334.22 300.13
350.31 328.17 304.50 278.88 250.60 218.40 179.32 120.55
239.15 217.10 193.38 167.42 138.30 104.14 59.97
151.59 131.08 109.15 85.40 59.23 29.83 0.00
87.08 69.68 51.66 33.16 14.84 0.00
43.68 30.72 18.33 7.38 0.00 0.00
18.01 10.04 3.67 0.00 0.00
5.45 1.83 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00
ASSUMPTIONS CALCULATIONS NOTES
Asset Value (Vt) �5,000.00 Stepping-Time (dt) 1.0000 10-yr Treasury Bond 3.00% 0.25%
Strike Price #2 (Construction) �2,500.00 Up Step-Size (up) 1.0667 3-yr Treasury Bond 2.75% 0.23%
Risk-free Rate (Rf) 0.19% Down Step-Size (down) 0.9374 2-yr CD 2.25% 0.19%
Divident Yield (y) 0.00% Risk-neutral Probability (prob) 49.84% 1-yr Treasury Bond 2.00% 0.17%
Volatility (�) 6.46%
Maturity (t) 24 Monthly Volatility 1.12%
Lattice Steps 24 Strike Price #1 (Resettlement) �1,282.74 Quarterly Volatility 3.24% 1.87% (Implied monthly volatility)
Semi Annual Volatility 6.66% 2.72% (Implied monthly volatility)
Annual Volatility 13.62% 3.93% (Implied monthly volatility)
Biennial Volatility 31.65% 6.46% (Implied monthly volatility)
Treshhold Volatility 7.87%
Res. Bldg. Efficiency 100.00%
Construction Cost �2,500.00 (RMB / m2)
Apartment Rental Rate �30.00 (RMB / m2 / Month)
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Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Execute
Continue
Continue Execute
Continue Continue
Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue End
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue End
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue End
Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue End
Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue End
Continue Continue
Continue End
Continue
End
ASSUMPTIONS CALCULATIONS NOTES
Asset Value (Vt) �5,000.00 Stepping-Time (dt) 1.0000 10-yr Treasury Bond 3.00% 0.25%
Strike Price #2 (Construction) �2,500.00 Up Step-Size (up) 1.0667 3-yr Treasury Bond 2.75% 0.23%
Risk-free Rate (Rf) 0.19% Down Step-Size (down) 0.9374 2-yr CD 2.25% 0.19%
Divident Yield (y) 0.00% Risk-neutral Probability (prob) 49.84% 1-yr Treasury Bond 2.00% 0.17%
Volatility (�) 6.46%
Maturity (t) 24 Monthly Volatility 1.12%
Lattice Steps 24 Strike Price #1 (Resettlement) �1,282.74 Quarterly Volatility 3.24% 1.87% (Implied monthly volatility)
Semi Annual Volatility 6.66% 2.72% (Implied monthly volatility)
Annual Volatility 13.62% 3.93% (Implied monthly volatility)
Biennial Volatility 31.65% 6.46% (Implied monthly volatility)
Treshhold Volatility 7.87%
Res. Bldg. Efficiency 100.00%
Construction Cost �2,500.00 (RMB / m2)
Apartment Rental Rate �30.00 (RMB / m2 / Month)
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Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
7128.93
6456.74
5827.04 5813.05
5237.15 5223.19
4684.59 4670.66 4656.68
4167.01 4153.11 4139.16
3682.24 3668.37 3654.45 3640.47
3228.23 3214.37 3200.48 3186.53
2803.06 2789.21 2775.33 2761.41 2747.43
2405.63 2391.13 2377.23 2363.31 2349.36
2036.30 2019.77 2004.55 1990.59 1976.63 1962.65
1696.94 1676.97 1658.37 1641.78 1627.72 1613.70
1390.27 1366.11 1342.65 1320.62 1301.36 1287.15 1273.03
1090.78 1062.37 1033.99 1006.46 981.97 967.53
821.31 787.88 753.07 717.23 682.44 667.62
584.87 546.31 504.14 456.88 401.74
385.35 342.93 294.30 234.49 139.08
226.87 184.04 133.88 69.19
112.41 75.17 34.42 0.00
41.66 17.12 0.00
8.52 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00
Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Execute
Continue
Continue Execute
Continue Continue
Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue Continue Execute
Continue Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue Continue End
Continue Continue Continue
Continue Continue End
Continue Continue
Continue End
Continue
End
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Appendix L Decision 1 Lattice (Resettlement)
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